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Abstract 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been facing a displacement crisis since 1994. 
This study focused on eastern DRC, as it has endured protracted conflict resulting in the forced 
displacement of millions of people. The majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are 
located in the eastern region of the country, finding refuge with host families and communities. 
Despite the vast number of IDPs living outside of displacement camps, scholars and practitioners 
generally focus their attention on camps. The purpose of this research was to examine the 
experiences of IDPs living in host communities, to shed light on this invisible population. 
Interviews were conducted with IDPs who had self-settled in the towns of Bukavu and Mudaka 
in the province of South Kivu. The research explored three aspects of displacement: cause of 
displacement, flight, and settlement. The thesis found that a high number of IDPs experienced 
direct violence related to the conflict that forced them to flee. Many brave risks of future attacks 
to stay near their homes and livelihoods but eventually decide to flee further from the violence, 
leaving behind their personal resources. Once in a host community, IDPs are faced with the 
dilemma of securing food and shelter despite having lost their livelihoods and resources during 
displacement. IDPs demonstrate resilience in developing new livelihoods but are confined by the 
informal job market in their host communities. The research found that IDPs in Mudaka were 
able to find employment in the local agriculture sector, similar to their traditional livelihoods; 
while IDPs in Bukavu were forced to find work in the over-saturated urban environment, most 
often as porters. In both cases livelihoods only provided enough income to live on a subsistence 
basis, where choices between food, shelter, and education had to be made. Finally, the research 
highlighted questions of integration into host communities as well as possibilities of return and 
reintegration. Participants from Bukavu overwhelmingly wished to return to their homes once 
their villages become secure enough, where as those in Mudaka had little desire to return to their 
homes.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Introduction: Context of Internal Displacement in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
The Democratic Republic of Congo1 (DRC) has a long history of unrest. The country was first 
colonized in 1885, as the personal property of Belgium’s King Leopold II. The country did not 
gain its independence until June 30, 1960, when Patrice Lumbumba was elected prime minister 
and Joseph Kasavubu became president. Following independence instability was rife in the 
country. In 1965, commander-in-chief of the army, Mobutu Sese Seko seized control of the 
government and declared himself president. Mobutu ruled as the country’s dictator until 1997.  
 
Since 1996 the Congo has faced almost continual conflict. The conflict, often referred to as 
Africa’s World War, is demarcated as the First Congo War (officially ending in 1997) and the 
Second Congo War (officially ending in 2003). Despite peace agreements signed in 2003, 
pockets of conflict remain in the eastern region of the country. A plethora of non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs) operate within the country, sometimes with the support of neighboring 
governments2.  Previous attempts to integrate NSAGs into the military have often failed, as some 
groups are allowed to maintain parallel military and administrative chains of command in the 
same territorial zones they controlled prior to integration3. The failure of the state to maintain its 
territorial control and address NSAGs operating in the eastern region has allowed for violence to 
continue plaguing the region.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Formerly known as Zaire. 
2 UN. Democratic Republic of Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious 
2 UN. Democratic Republic of Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious 
Violations of Human Rights and International Law. 
3 This was the case with Congres National Pour la Defense du People (CNDP) rebel group. For further information 
see: International Crisis Group, “No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda.  (Africa Report 165, 
2010). 
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The conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 5.4 million people, who died from conflict-related 
causes within the country between August 1998 and April 20074. Conflict-related deaths are 
often not at the hands of armed groups, but rather they reflect the correlation between conflict 
and quality of life, as deaths are indirectly caused by disease and malnutrition that arise from the 
displacement and disruption that conflict brings5. The DRC’s almost 70 million inhabitants live 
in bleak conditions. As of 2006, 71.3% of the population lived below the poverty line6. The 
country was ranked last on the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 2011 Human 
Development Index (HDI)7. The index paints a grim picture of the current state of the country, as 
illustrated by the following statistics. Life expectancy as of 2011 was 48.4 years. The mean years 
of schooling are 3.5. As of 2009 the under-five mortality rate in the Congo was 170 per 1000 live 
births8. Stunting, when a child is too short for his or her age due to malnutrition, occurs in 45.8% 
of the population under five years of age within the country9. These indicators demonstrate the 
grim health and social realities faced by the civilian population.  
 
The conflict in the DRC directly and indirectly contributes to the grim quality of life in the 
country. The targeting of civilians is one of the most troublesome characteristics of the conflict. 
The majority, if not all, armed groups have been responsible for attacks on civilian populations, 
particularly in the eastern region of the country. The country’s military, Forces Armees de le 
Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), is also a known perpetrator of abuses against the 
civilian population. One of the most striking features of attacks on civilians is the use of rape and 
sexual violence, which serves as a mechanism for armed groups to tear apart the social fabric of 
these deeply conservative communities. International media and advocacy groups tend to focus 
on the prevalence of sexual violence, often overlooking the history, context, and causes of the 
conflict.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 International Rescue Committee, “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an Ongoing Crisis,” (New 
York: International Rescue Committee, 2007), 14. 
5 Slobodanka Teodosijevic, “Armed Conflicts and Food Insecurity,” (Rome: The Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 2003), 8.	  
6 World Bank, “Country Profile: Congo, Democratic Republic,” 2012. 
7 United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2011” (New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, 2011); the Index is based on health, education, and standards of living statistics. 
8 World Health Organization, “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Health Profile,” 2012.  
9	  United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2011” (New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, 2011), 153. 
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Despite officially reaching peace in 2003, the same year the rate of internal displacement within 
the DRC reached 3.4 million people, the country’s highest rate10. Internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) refer to: 
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state 
border11. 
 Within Congo, displacement occurs in cycles, dependent on the conflict. If armed groups are 
carrying out campaigns in specific territories, civilians will likely flee due to violence or 
anticipated insecurity but return home as soon as they no longer perceive a threat.  As of 2011 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 1.7 
million IDPs in the DRC, primarily located in the eastern region of the country12. Additionally, 
there are an estimated 491,481 Congolese refugees residing outside of the country13. An 
estimated 78% of the IDP population is located in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu14. 
The launch of a new rebellion in 2012, by mutineers in North Kivu called M2315 caused a spike 
in displacement. As of November 2012, 2.4 million people are internally displaced, of which 1.6 
million are located in the Kivu provinces16. This recent rebellion illustrates the cycles of 
insecurity and displacement in the eastern region of the country.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Human Rights Watch, “Always on the Run: Vicious Cycles of Displacement in Eastern Congo,” (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2010), 19.  
11 OCHA, “Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons,” (United Nations, 1998), paragraph 2.  
12 UNHCR, “2011 Country Operations Profile: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 2011.  
13 Ibid.	  
14 Ibid. 
15 Primarily comprised of ex-Congres National Pour la Defense du People (CNDP) defectors of the army, named 
after the 23 March 2009 agreement between the CNDP and Congolese government. 
16 OCHA, “DRC: Aid Operation is Efficient but not Sufficient,” (November 2012). 
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International refugee law does not extended to IDPs as by definition they have fled within the 
country and not crossed an international border, thus IDPs fall under the responsibility and 
protection of the Congolese government17.  
 
Former President Mobutu’s policy towards citizens of debrouillez-vous (fend for yourself) has 
largely carried over to the present government. Soldier’s salaries often go unpaid, causing many 
to finance their own salaries through extortion and illegal taxation of the civilian population. The 
FARDC have also been known to carry out attacks on civilians. A survey carried out by Group 
for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) found that civilians in South Kivu 
viewed the FARDC as the second most common source of insecurity18. With the Congolese 
government unable to control its own territory and unable (or unwilling) to control its own 
military forces, it remains incapable of providing protection and assistance to its displaced and 
vulnerable populations.   
 
As the Congolese government cannot provide adequate assistance to vulnerable populations, a 
plethora of international organizations have stepped in. Eight humanitarian cluster groups 
operate in the DRC19:  
• Health: led by the WHO; 
• Nutrition: led by UNICEF; 
• Food Security: led by FAO; 
• Non-Food Items and Shelter: led by UNICEF 
• Logistics: led by WFP; 
• Protection: led by UNHCR; 
• Education: led by UNICEF; 
• Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene: led by UNICEF. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Geneva Conventions 1949, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf. 
18 GRIP, “Small Arms in Eastern Congo: Perceptions of Insecurity,” (2011). 
19 http://www.unocha.org/drc/coordination/clusters	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The provision of assistance to refugees in the DRC is considered a multi-sectoral response, 
which is currently led by UNHCR. 
 
Cluster groups are designed so that international organizations and NGO’s working in similar 
sectors can coordinate programs and responsibilities20. Also operating in the DRC is the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the D.R. Congo21 (MONUSCO) peacekeeping 
mission, which is mandated with protecting civilians. MONUSCO is an integrated mission, 
meaning humanitarian coordination and leadership occurs under the peacekeeping mission. 
United Nations (UN) integrated missions are designed to increase coordination between UN 
agencies operating in conflict or post-conflict situations22. In the case of the DRC, all UN 
agencies regardless of political, military or humanitarian missions are led by MONUSO. 
However, this approach is controversial as UN humanitarian agencies can be easily associated 
with political and peacekeeping agencies. As NGOs coordinate with UN humanitarian agencies 
through mechanisms such as cluster meetings, NGOs are now concerned that they too are 
vulnerable to associations with UN political and peacekeeping agendas. Ultimately integrated 
missions face concerns over perceptions of humanitarian impartiality23.  
  
The displaced in Congo seek refuge in a variety of sites. According to Steve McDowell, sites of 
refuge depend on the length of time displaced24. Urban cities, rural villages, as well as 
spontaneous and formal camps are all host sites for IDPS. Some people may decide to hide in the 
bush (jungle) close to their villages for days or weeks, hoping for armed groups to leave25. Each 
type of IDP site comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. In choosing a location, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/drc/coordination/clusters 
21 Previously known as the United Nations Organization Mission in the D.R. Congo (MONUC); Originally 
established in 1999 as MONUC, changed to MONUSCO in 2010 and authorized until June 2013; more information 
can be found here: http://monusco.unmissions.org/ 
22 Metcalfe, Vitcoria, et al. “UN Integration and Humanitarian Space,” (2011), 
http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/FINAL%20Integration%20humanitarian%20space%20study%20Dec11.pdf 
23 Norwegian Refugee Council, “A Partnership at Risk? The UN-NGO Relationship in Light of UN Integration,” 
(February 2012), 3. 
24 Steve McDowell, “Internal Displacement in North Kivu: Hosting, Camps, and Coping Mechanisms,” (2008), 12.  
25 Ibid. 
6	  
	  
McDowell found that a variety of factors influenced the decisions of those displaced, including: 
security, location, ethnicity, and expectations of aid26.  
 
The vast majority of IDPs in the DRC live outside of formal camps, either in spontaneous camps 
or in urban or rural host communities. Formal camps are registered with the UNHCR and receive 
humanitarian assistance. As of 2012 there were 31 formal camps in the DRC27. Formal camps 
are problematic in terms of ‘institutional convenience’ as humanitarian actors focus on assisting 
IDPs in formal camps, giving less attention those living outside of camps28. This is in part due to 
the difficulties of identifying IDPs in towns and urban cities. In towns, IDPs blend in with the 
local population, where as in camps they are registered and often hold identification cards. 
According to Refstie, Dolan, and Moses, the absence of humanitarian assistance for urban IDPs 
stems from conceptual debates on “voluntary versus forced migration, and when displacement 
ends.”29 
 
It was not until recently that urban refugees and IDPs began to receive attention from scholars 
and humanitarian organizations alike. While the field of knowledge on urban displacement is 
growing, the primary academic focus remains on refugees. Furthermore, the current debate of 
IDPs residing in urban areas should be considered, as finding a durable solution requires more 
research. The Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons was created in 
2010, according to the document:  
  A durable solution can be achieved through: 
• Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin; 
• Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take 
refuge; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid, 14.  
27 UNHCR, “DRC Fact Sheet,” (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4fab74189.html 
28 Hilde Refstie, Chris Dolan, and Moses Chrispus Okello, “Urban IDPs in Uganda: Victims of Institutional 
Convenience,” in Forced Migration Review 34, 2010, 32.  
29 Ibid. 
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• Sustainable integration in another part of the country30. 
The framework stipulates that a durable solution, other than return, can be met if displacement-
specific needs are met and the person can enjoy their rights without facing displacement-specific 
discrimination31. Differentiating between displacement-specific and non-displacement specific 
can be difficult, but the general rule from the framework is that non-displacement specific needs 
are those that the local non-displaced population also faces. A durable solution requires adequate 
and sustainable access to: essential food and water, basic shelter, sanitation, primary school 
education, and essential medical services32. While IDPs should have access to livelihoods, it is in 
relative terms, meaning they should have the same access as locals.  
 
Significance of Study 
While rights-based approaches are ideal, evidence-based approaches are necessary to develop 
policies that can be implemented on the ground. IDPs remain largely invisible, in part due to the 
research gap on those living outside of formal camps. If IDPs living outside of camps, are being 
overlooked due to an academic debate on voluntary versus forced migration, then it becomes 
essential that any research conducted on self-settled IDPs includes an assessment of the cause of 
displacement. Additional understanding of the experiences and conditions of the displaced living 
outside of camps and the effects on the host communities is necessary for effective policy and 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
Largely, the durable solutions framework for IDPs recommends integration, without taking into 
account to what capacity areas are able to absorb the displaced, potentially leaving both the host 
community and displaced population in vulnerable situations. Rapid urbanization contributes to 
and may even create humanitarian disasters, as urban populations are at high risk of food 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “IASC Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons,” 
(2010), 5. 
31 Ibid, 6. 
32 Ibid, 31.	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insecurity, disease, loss of livelihood, and marginalization33. Robert Muggah informs that rapid 
movement of IDPs into low and middle-income cities causes negative shocks including: 
increased pressures on already weak water and sanitation, conflict over access to land, and 
competition for resources with hosts34. Bukavu’s population has tripled since 1984, causing 
issues in infrastructure and ownership rights35. As Bukavu continues to experience rapid 
urbanization we must take into account these factors and ask to what extent is integration 
sustainable if it places IDPs and their hosts in economically vulnerable environments.  
 
In the DRC food insecurity is directly related to the conflict. Much of the country’s economy is 
based on agricultural production36. Conflict in rural areas causes displacement of the local 
farmers and herders, thus depleting food sources. This not only affects displaced persons whose 
livelihoods relied on agricultural production but also towns and cities, such as Bukavu. The 
depletion of agricultural production heightens poverty and can lead to food shortages. This loss 
of production needs to be closely examined, as does livelihood strategies used by IDPs, to 
understand the broader impact of protracted displacement on the country’s food security and 
economy. 
 
Objectives 
The objective of this research is to examine the displacement experience of Congolese IDPs 
living in host communities in order to gain insight on how individuals cope with the direct 
consequence of conflict (violence and displacement) but also with the indirect consequences 
(loss of resources and livelihoods). The research takes into account the following aspects of 
displacement: cause of displacement, fleeing/initial displacement experience, and settlement, to 
identify common experiences and themes within each. The study seeks to examine differences of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Roger Zetter and George Deikun, “Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas,” in Forced Migration 
Review 34, 2010, 5. 
34 Robert Muggah, “Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence,” (International 
Development Research Centre, May 2012), 33. 
35 Center for African Development and Security, “Reconnect Bukavu,” http://cads-cdsa.org/reconnect-bukavu/ 
36 World Food Program, “Executive Brief: Democratic Republic of Congo Comprehensive Food Security and 
Vulnerability Analysis 2007-2008,” 3.	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IDPs living in urban and rural communities, in doing so it will examine livelihood strategies and 
durable solutions.  
 
 It is my hope that this research will build on the existing knowledge to provide greater 
perspective on an IDP population that has remained largely invisible. It is thought that by gaining 
a wider view of the displacement experience of IDPs in South Kivu, scholars and actors in the 
field will be able identify further gaps and create more dialogue on the sustainability of durable 
solution, invisibility of IDPs outside of camps, and what these things mean not only for the 
displaced but also the host communities.  
 
Organization of Thesis 
The next chapter details the history of the current conflict in the DRC dating back to the 1994 
influx of Rwandan refugees. The chapter provides the context of the conflict to provide a 
foundation for understanding internal displacement within the country. Chapter III presents 
literature relevant to internal displacement in the DRC in terms of livelihoods, food security, and 
international frameworks. Chapter IV details the methods utilized to conduct this research. It also 
includes a discussion of ethical precautions taken, as well as challenges faced. The research 
findings are analyzed and discussed in Chapter V. Final thoughts and conclusions are then 
presented in Chapter VI.   
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Chapter II: Conflict in the DRC:  
From Refugee Influx to Regional War  
“War ends nothing”- Central African Proverb 
In Chapter I, the significance and objectives of this research were identified. This chapter 
provides a background on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following the 
influx of Rwandan refugees in 1994 to present. This history provides the necessary foundation 
for understanding the causes and consequences of conflict-induced displacement in eastern DRC. 
One must understand the history of conflict in order to examine the nature of displacement 
within the country.  
 
The 1994 Refugee Influx that Sparked ‘Africa’s World War’ 
In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, internal conflicts often have extraterritorial elements as 
borders are porous and group identities transcend those of nation-states. The conflict in Rwanda 
during the early 1990’s transformed into a regional war in what some have referred to as 
‘Africa’s World War.’ The influx of over a million displaced persons of the Hutu ethnic group 
from Rwanda into the DRC following the 1994 genocide was unique in many ways and played a 
fundamental role in the ensuing regional war. 
 
Following Rwanda’s decolonization from the Belgians in 1962, the Hutu ethnic majority was 
given control of the government.  Since colonialization, tensions between Hutu and the Tutsi 
minority have led to violence, causing many Tutsi to flee to neighboring countries. Within the 
host countries of refuge, the exiled Rwandan-Tutsi would form armed groups that would launch 
cross-border attacks against Hutus in Rwanda. In response to the cross-border attacks, the Hutu 
in Rwanda would further repress the local Tutsi civilian population37. On October 1st, 1990 the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Ugandan-based Tutsi exiles launched an attack that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Sarah Kenyon  Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and  the Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Aid, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 78. 
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culminated into a civil war, which lasted until 1993. Ethnic tensions within Rwanda led to the 
1994 genocide that began on April 6, 1994 and ended with the RPF gaining full control of the 
country on July 4th, 199438. 
 
 As the RPF gained control of Rwanda, a mass exodus of Hutus began seeking refuge in 
neighboring countries. According to Amnesty International, an estimated one million refugees 
fled to eastern DRC, including members of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), Hutu political 
leadership, and Interhamwe39 militias40. Many Hutu civilians were not forced out of Rwanda by 
the RPF but were instructed to leave by Hutu leaders in order to create a state in exile41.  Once 
settled into formal refugee camps, the Hutu genocide leaders were able to take full control, 
maintaining their political and military structures42. The camps were fully militarized as leaders 
publicly spoke of plans to destabilize the new government in Rwanda and utilized the refugee 
camps in the DRC as recruitment bases, sources of material support, and bases for cross border 
attacks43. The failure of international actors within the refugee camps to prevent the 
militarization of the camps and maintain there civilian nature has been highly criticized44. The 
exiles would frequently launch cross-border attacks against the Tutsi living in Rwanda. 
Congolese Tutsi faced attacks as well. Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of what was at the time 
Zaire (later renamed DRC), had been a close friend of the Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana whose death triggered the start of the 1994 genocide.  Some alleged Mobutu was 
selling arms to the exiled Hutu political movement for their attacks, while that remains difficult 
to confirm at the very least he was turning a blind eye towards their actions within the country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were 
killed when their airplane was shot down over Rwanda. It remains unknown who was responsible for the 
assassination but the murder of Habyarimana, a Hutu, culminated the ethnic tensions that manifested into the 1994 
Genocide during which 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed. 
39A Hutu paramilitary organization that was supported by the former Hutu government in Rwanda to perpetrate the 
1994 genocide.  Now the term is widely used within Congo for any armed Rwandan. 
40 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests” (1997), 6. 
41 Sarah Kenyon  Lischer, , Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and  the Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Aid, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 78. 
42 Ibid, 80; Human Rights Watch, “Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the 
Rwandan Genocide” (2005), 4. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid; The failure of the international actors to disarm combatants, humanitarian assistance to known combatants 
and political leaders is a highly contentious issue but was justified by actors who feared the combatants would prey 
on civilians if not provided with goods.  
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Figure 2.1: Map of DRC 
    
 The First Congo War 
Facing cross-border attacks, 
the new Rwandan government, 
led by Paul Kigame, entered 
into an alliance with Laurent 
Kabila, a Congolese political 
opponent of President 
Mobutu45. Laurent Kabila’s 
opposition group, the Alliance 
des Forces pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and Rwanda further aligned themselves 
with Uganda, Burundi, and Angola46. In September 1996, the AFDL launched an offence in 
eastern Congo.  By the end of October, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was openly carrying 
out military operations in Congo and providing military support to the AFDL.  
 
Aligned with the AFDL, the RPA began military assaults on refugee camps in eastern DRC, in 
an effort to eliminate the Hutu militants who had been using the camps as support bases47.  The 
assaults on the refugee camps were brutal as the RPA failed to distinguish between civilian 
refugees and the armed ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-RAF) and Interhamwe, directly violating 
the rights of the refugees under the 1951 refugee convention and 1967 protocol48.  The RPA and 
AFDL utilized the presence of humanitarian aid to draw refugees out from hiding, and then they 
would proceed to block the aid workers access to the refugees, and kill the refugees once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ruled the DRC for thirty-two years, following the countries decolonization.  The dictator quickly lost his 
popularity in the country as he dismantled the government institutions, failed to prevent the country’s economic 
downfall, and epitomized the kleptocracy of post-colonial African rulers.  
46 Uganda, Burundi, and Angola had all been facing similar cross-border attacks from armed-groups based in the 
DRC, whom Mobutu allowed to operate out of the country.  
47 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests” (1997), 6. 
48 UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html 
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humanitarian actors were out of sight49. At the Kirumbu refugee camp, AFDL forces supplied by 
Rwandan helicopters killed an estimated 500 refugees50. In addition to killing refugees, the 
armed forces used their assaults on the camps to push the displaced back into Rwanda, forcefully 
repatriating many refugees51.  
 
Crimes against civilians were not limited to the RPA and AFDL, as the Armed Forces of Zaire 
(FAZ) mounted its defensive push against the invading forces, it too carried out crimes against 
the civilian population.  Civilians were subjected to sexual violence, looting, and extra-judicial 
murder by all sides.  During the AFDL offensive, both the refugee and the Congolese civilian 
population faced violent attacks by the various armed groups, with little acknowledgment from 
the international community. In April 1997, the AFDL forces took control of Kinshasa and on 
May 17th, Laurent Kabila was named president. Once in power Kabila renamed the country the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997.  While much of the Congolese population was 
suspicious of Kabila and the AFDL’s relations with Rwanda, he represented a welcomed end to 
Mobutu’s thirty-two year long dictatorship. 
 
The Second Congo War 
The peace did not last long. While Rwanda expected Kabila to remain its ally, the new president 
had other plans. Once Laurent Kabila consolidated his power, he turned his back on the allies 
that had brought him there. On July 26, 1998 Kabila ordered the removal of any foreign troops 
from the country. Following the removal of the RPA from the DRC, Kabila’s government turned 
a blind eye to the activities of the Interhamwe and ex-FAR when they resumed their cross-border 
attacks in Rwanda52.  For Rwanda, Kabila’s actions were not only insulting but also viewed as a 
threat to the country’s security. Rwanda was still struggling to deal with the refugees that had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests” (1997), 7. 
50Ibid, 23. 
51 Ibid.	  
52 Sarah Kenyon  Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and  the Dilemmas of Humanitarian 
Aid, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 84. 
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been forcefully repatriated from the attacks on the refugee camps and was not prepared to for the 
resumption of attacks by ex-FAR and Interhamwe53.  
 
By August 1998 conflict re-emerged in eastern DRC with Rwandan and Ugandan troops taking 
offensive positions.  Using similar tactics to their first military invasion, international alliances 
were made to back a new Congolese opposition group. Rwanda was able to piece together a new 
Congolese opposition group similar to what it had done with the AFDL.  The new opposition 
group, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy; 
RCD)54, was comprised of former Mobutusit, Congolese Tusti, and others who felt deceived by 
Kabila55. Regionally, the alliances were split. Rwanda aligned with Burundi and Uganda but had 
failed to gain the support of Angola. Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe aligned themselves 
with Kabila. While Rwanda’s allied forces were able to quickly sweep through the eastern region 
of the Congo, upon reaching the west they were confronted by Angolan, Zimbabwean, and 
Congolese forces. The conflict in the west was played out in Kinshasa, with Kabila’s forces 
being the ultimate victor, pushing the Rwandan-led forces back into the eastern region of the 
Congo. On July 10, 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the DRC, Angola, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  The ceasefire called for the withdrawal of 
all foreign forces and the installation of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. 
 
While the western region of the country experienced relative peace following the peace 
agreement, the east continued to be plagued by conflict. Instead of fully withdrawing their 
forces, Rwanda and Uganda moved their troops into the eastern region of the Congo. Local 
vigilante groups called Mai Mai formed to protect their villages from these foreign forces. Non-
state armed groups (NSAGs) continued their operations. Rwanda continued to use the RCD 
forces to maintain control over the eastern provinces. However, the alliance between Rwanda 
and Uganda fell apart in 1999. In 1999 and 2000 the countries battled each other for control of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid. 
54 First led by Ernest WambadiaWamba. Later split with Wamba leading RCD-Wamba and the original RCD 
became RCD-Goma.  However, now there are a plethora of RCD splinter groups.  
55 Jason Stearns, “Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: the Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa,” (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2011), 205.	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the mineral rich town of Kisangani. At the time, Uganda was backing the Mouvement de 
Liberation du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo; MLC) rebel group led by 
Jean-Pierre Bemba. The Congolese government also used NSAGs as proxies supplying the ex-
FAR, Interhamwe, Mai Mai, and various other armed groups to fight against the RCD and 
Rwandan forces in the east. According to the UNHCR there were over 2 million IDPS in the 
DRC in 1999, many of who were displaced due to government and NSAG activities in the 
eastern provinces56. The UN found that from 1993 to 2003 at any given time, eight national 
armies and twenty-one non-state armed groups were taking part in the conflict in the DRC57. The 
presence of so many ill trained, unstructured, armed groups wreaked havoc on the Congolese 
civilian population, killing over 5.4 million people between 1998 and 2007 according to the 
International Rescue Committee.   
 
The motives behind the launch of the war appeared to shift after the Rwandan-led forces 
retreated back to the east.  In 2001, Rwandan forces had control of a territory in eastern DRC 16 
times larger than the country of Rwanda58. According to reports by Amnesty International, many 
of the killings of Congolese civilians occurred in mineral rich areas of the east59. The DRC has 
mineral deposits of coltan, gold, diamonds, tin, tantalum, and tungsten, adding a lucrative 
element to occupation. The RPA and RCD-Goma forces were alleged to have been forcefully 
displacing civilian populations to gain easier access to mine mineral rich areas60.The east became 
a ‘gold mine’ of which everyone was vying for control.   
 
On January 17, 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards61.  Kabila was 
succeeded by his son Joseph. In 2002, Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Agreement, 
leading to the withdrawal of Rwandan forces by mid-October 2002. The Congolese government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Report 2009: DRC,” p. 28, http://www.unhcr.org/4c08f1f29.html  
57 UN, “Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most 
Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Law,”  
58 Amnesty International, “Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandese-Controlled East: Devastating Human Toll,” 
(2001), 3. 
59 Ibid; not all areas of the east are rich in minerals. Killings also take place in areas that do not have mineral 
deposits.  
60Ibid, 7. 
61 The motivation for the assassination remains unclear.	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also carried out negotiations with NSAGs, resulting in the Pretoria II Agreement. In 2003 the 
Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the DRC; FARDC) 
was established as the new national military, comprised of a mix of the former regimes military 
and NSAGs. Additionally, a transitional power-sharing government led by Joseph Kabila was 
introduced under the Final Act agreement in 2003.  In 2006, Joseph Kabila won the country’s 
first democratic elections. While these successes have often been viewed as an end to the war, in 
reality, conflict in the east remains 
 
Post 2003 Conflict   
Following the defeat of RCD-Goma’s political party in the 2006 national elections, Laurent 
Nakunda62 established the Congres National Pour la Defense du People (National Congress for 
the Defense of People; CNDP). Many former RCD-Goma fighters, along with recruits from 
Rwanda joined the group63. The group’s objectives focused on the defeat of the FDLR and for 
increased rights of Tutsi. Rwanda provided support to the CNDP, including the recruitment of 
soldiers and the provision of military equipment64. The CNDP quickly established control of the 
Masisi and Rutshuru territories in the province of North Kivu. After almost a year of fighting, the 
CNDP and DRC government reached an agreement in December 2006 entailing a limited 
military integration program, known as mixage. However, by mid-2007 the agreement failed and 
fighting resumed in August 2007. During this time the CNDP also carried out attacks against the 
FDLR in the Kivus65.  
 
In August 2008, the FARDC launched an offense against the CNDP but were quickly overrun66. 
On October 29th the CNDP took control of the Rutshuru and Kiwanja territories in North Kivu. 
Following their territorial gains, the CNDP ordered the destruction of all IDP camps within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62Nakunda is a Congolese Tutsi, who had been a commander in the RCD.  
63 Human Rights Watch, “Renewed Crisis in North Kivu,” (2007), 18.  
64United Nations Security Council, S/2008/773. 
65Ibid, 23. 
66 Human Rights Watch, “Killings in Kiwanja: The UN’s Inability to Protect Civilians,” (2008)  
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territories67. It was estimated that at the time of closure there were 27,000 IDPs in formal and 
informal camps, in addition to over 25,000 IDPs living with local host communities68.  Satellite 
imagery taken on November 4th confirmed the complete destruction of camps in the CNDP held 
territories. While fleeing the CNDP advance, Congolese soldiers stole goods from the recently 
(re)displaced and forced some to act as porters carrying looted goods69. These events illustrate 
the multiple security threats civilians face during military and NSAGs offensives in eastern 
Congo.  
 
On December 5, 2008, Congo and Rwanda announced a joint military campaign against the 
FDLR70. Following the announcement, on January 5, 2009 Nkunda, the leader of the CNDP, was 
ousted by the group’s military chief of staff, Bosco Ntaganda. After ousting Nkunda, Ntaganda 
signed a ceasefire with the Congolese military on January 16th that provided for the integration of 
the CNDP into the FARDC. On March 23, 2008 the CNDP signed a political agreement with the 
government of Congo, including provisions of amnesty, the release of political prisoners, and the 
inclusion into the government71. The CNDP then underwent an accelerated integration process.  
 
In January 2009, 4,000 Rwandan troops crossed into eastern Congo to begin the joint military 
offensive against the FDLR, called Umoja Wetu. On February 25th, Rwanda fully withdrew its 
troops as agreed upon with the Congolese government. Recognizing that further action against 
the FDLR was needed, MONUC then entered into an agreement with the Congolese government 
to launch another offensive against the FDLR, known as Kimia II. The military operations were 
successful in repatriating over 1,000 FDLR combatants to Rwanda72. Despite these successes the 
operations failed to dismantle FDLR’s political and military structures. Additionally, the 
humanitarian consequences were devastating, with over 1,400 civilians killed by armed groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67Ibid, 6. 
68Ibid, 14.	  
69Ibid, 21. 
70Ibid, 41. 
71Ibid, 42. 
72Ibid, 44. 
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between January and September 200973. During the same period over 7,500 rapes were reported 
and over 900,000 people were displaced in North and South Kivu74.  
 
The integration of the CNDP had been a contentious issue. According to the International Crisis 
Group, the CNDP was allowed to maintain parallel military and administrative chains of 
command, in addition to control of mines in North and South Kivu75.  The integration process 
has faced many problems, with many groups splintering off and others maintaining their own 
command structure acting as rogue military branches in the eastern provinces. The flaws of the 
integration were illustrated in March 2012, when ex-CNDP rebels mutinied against the FARDC, 
under the leadership of General Bosco Ntaganda. Research by a UN Group of Experts found that 
Col. Sultani Makenga and Gen. Ntaganda were jointly commanding a new rebel group, known as 
M2376. The group took its named from the March 23, 2009 agreement between the CNDP and 
the Congolese government.  
 
According to the 2012 UN Group of Experts report, the mutiny had been planned prior to the 
2011 presidential election, as ex-CNDP commanders feared President Kabila would redeploy 
former CNDP units outside of the Kivus77. The report also found evidence of Rwanda providing 
material and financial support for M23, including the provision of military equipment and 
recruits from Rwanda78. In addition to M23, there are currently 21 NSAGs active in the DRC79. 
The M23 advance forced the FARDC to withdrawal troops from other insecure areas to be 
deployed in North Kivu against M23 in the Spring of 201280.  The re-location of FARDC troops 
created a security vacuum as other NSAGs were able to seize towns and villages that had 
previously been under the military’s control. This has further exacerbated ethnic tensions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73Ibid, 45. 
74Ibid, 45. 
75 International Crisis Group, “Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite Rapprochement with Rwanda,” ( November 
2010), 12.  
76 UN Group of Experts, S/2012/348.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, “Real-time Analysis of African Political Violence” in Conflict 
Trends (5), 2.  
80Oxfam, “Eastern Congo Reaches New Depths of Suffering as Militia’s Take Control,” (Oxfam, 2012). 
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sparked conflicts over land and resource control81. The recent increase of NSAG and military 
activity has led to a sharp rise in emergency humanitarian aid needs. As of December 2012, only 
56% of the funding required for OCHA’s Humanitarian Action Plan for the DRC had been 
secured82.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Oxfam, “Great Lakes Crisis: Situation Update,” 2012, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/emergency-
response/great-lakes-crisis.	  
82 United Nations News Center, Humanitarian Situation in Eastern Congo. 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43661#.UOvx5am8_dk 
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Chapter III: Literature Review 
 
The previous chapter provided a brief summary of the recent conflict in the DRC. This chapter 
examines academic literature relevant to internal displacement in eastern Congo, with particular 
attention to livelihoods and food security. Additionally, existing frameworks on internal 
displacement are discussed and examined.  
Internal Displacement in Eastern Congo 
The continuous cycles of violence in eastern DRC has led to the displacement of civilians trying 
to escape the violence and find some level of security. Recent crises of internal displacement 
began with the influx of Hutu refugees and armed groups from Rwanda in 1994. By mid-1994 
there were an estimated 500,000 IDPs in eastern DRC83. The level of internal displacement has 
historically varied with the amount of conflict in the region. The highest rate of internal 
displacement in the DRC occurred in 2003 when there was an estimated 3.4 million IDPs84.  At 
the end of 2011 UNHCR estimated that there were 1.7 million IDPs within the country. 
However, due to the M23 rebellion and resulting security vacuum in North and South Kivu, as of 
November 2012, there were 2.4 million IDPS in the country, 1.6 million of which are currently 
located in the Kivu provinces85. Additionally, there are 451,732 Congolese refugees living in 
host countries86. The majority of the IDPs in the Congo live outside of formal refugee camps, in 
host communities87. As of 2012, the UNHCR provides assistance to 70,000 IDPs living in 31 
camps88.  
 
IDPs in eastern Congo generally try to stay as close to home as possible. Many take refuge in the 
bush or jungle at first, trying to stay close to their homes, livelihoods, and food sources89. 
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Staying in the bush is dangerous as IDPs face daily hardships and risk running into armed 
groups. They choose the bush despite the risks as they know from previous experience or from 
others that they are unlikely to have access to food or assistance once displaced from their 
homes90. IDPs hiding in the bush are often pushed further away from their homes as they try to 
avoid NSAGs and armed attacks91. 
 
Steve McDowell led a research project for UNICEF and CARE on the conditions of IDPs in 
North Kivu in 2008. The research was some of the most in-depth carried out on the IDP 
population in the country, despite its focus on the North Kivu province. The study found that 
IDPs generally sought refuge with host families, often with relatives or friends; however, some  
IPDs were hosted by strangers92. The presence of IDPs creates serious economic and security 
burdens for hosts. IDPs would help tend fields or find work to supplement the host households’ 
income, however, after one-month resources would typically become strained leading both the 
hosts and IDPs to become economically vulnerable93. Hosts also become physically vulnerable 
as the possessions IDPs brought with them make both targets of robberies94.  
 
Since the industrial revolution people have been moving into towns and cities, increasingly those 
displaced by natural disasters and conflict have been seeking refuge in urban settings, giving rise 
to the phenomena commonly referred to as ‘urban displacement.’  The phenomenon is not 
limited to the large metropolises of the world, as smaller cities in developing countries are also 
hosting large numbers of displaced persons95. The presence of displaced populations in urban 
centers increases demands for resources, particularly land and food, often exacerbating pre-
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existing deficits96. Urban IDPs face unique vulnerabilities such as displacement within the city 
due to evictions or forced relocation97.  
 
Despite their needs, urban IDPs often remain invisible to humanitarian actors. The urban 
environment makes it more difficult for aid organizations to identify displaced populations for 
targeted assistance.  Urban IDPs are often overlooked by aid agencies as they blend in with the 
urban poor making it difficult to distinguish the groups98. In countries such as the DRC, IDPs 
seek refuge in cities like Bukavu but also in villages, where they blend with the rural population 
and also remain invisible to the aid agencies. While the UNHCR has reviewed and adapted its 
policies on urban refugees, no actions have been taken to address urban IDPs99. One factor 
limiting humanitarian assistance to IDPs is donor fatigue. Since 2009 funding for humanitarian 
relief in the DRC has steadily dropped100. Only 61% of the funding appeal for humanitarian 
assistance in the DRC was met in 2012101.  
 
Formal camps offer the most secure assistance to IDPs as they offer target sites for humanitarian 
assistance.  McDowell’s research found that IDPs viewed formal camps as providing aid, 
security, and employment102.  A gap exists between the perception of security in camps and its 
actual presence. It the DRC, soldiers have been known to rape women and kidnap children from 
the camps. The government is also a cause of insecurity for IDPs, as they seek to demonstrate 
regional security by closing IDP camps. After a military offensive against the FDLR in 2009, 
known as Kima II, the government sought to illustrate the success of the mission by closing five 
official refugee camps, forcing 60,000 IDPs out over night103.  Forcible closure causes many 
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problems, as humanitarian agencies are not always able to track where the IDPs relocated to, 
delaying and in some cases preventing aid from reaching the relocated IDPs. 
 
While the closing of the camp was somewhat unique, it is common for IDPs to be displaced 
multiple times. As security improves many IDPs return to their homes, but as conflict returns 
they are forced to flee again weeks, months, or even years after they were first displaced.  
Despite continued insecurity, IDPs often travel back and forth from their site of refuge to their 
homes to check on their property104.  Such traveling is extremely dangerous for IDPs as they risk 
running into armed groups. In 2009, Human Rights Watch reports indicated that FARDC troops 
were stopping IDPs during their flight, forcing them into labor, robbing, and raping them105. 
These are very serious crimes being committed by Congolese troops, the very forces who are 
responsible for providing protection for the people they are abusing. Such incidences highlight 
the need for further examination of attacks against IDPs during flight.   
 
Livelihoods and Food Security 
Agriculture is a central pillar in the DRC. Within South Kivu 83.3% of rural households rely on 
farming and agricultural related activities as their livelihood106. The country still has vast 
potential for further agricultural development, as only 10% of the country’s arable land is 
currently used107. Despite the Congo’s potential, it remains widely food insecure. According to 
the World Food Program, six of the eleven provinces in the country have general acute 
malnutrition (GAM) rates over 10%108. For 2009, 2010, and 2011 the Congo was ranked last on 
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the Global Hunger Index (GHI)109. Additionally, the country has the highest rate of under-
nourished persons in Africa and the highest prevalence of malnutrition world-wide110.  
 
There are direct links between conflict and loss of food production. Research by Slobodanka 
Teodosijevic found that both per-capita agriculture and food production significantly decline 
during conflicts in relations to prior to the onset of conflict111. In Congo food production between 
1998 and 2008 declined by an estimated 30% to 40%112. This time period falls within the time of 
conflict in the eastern region of the country. Research found that between 2006 and 2008 over 
60% of rural households lost crops due to armed groups113. Armed groups will intentionally 
destroy or hinder means of producing and accessing food these tactics include: destruction of 
wild food sources, disruption of markets, restrictions on mobility, and forced displacement114. As 
farmers flee the violence and control of armed groups, food shortages occur that extend into the 
economy and last years115. Additionally, the use of landmines poses challenges to farmers and 
hinders transportation in parts of the country116 
 
Those who lose their livelihoods must adapt new strategies. International organizations and 
NGO’s alike do carry out livelihood programs with certain vulnerable communities. With or 
without assistance IDPs develop coping strategies that differ between urban and rural areas. In 
rural areas, people continue to have access to land so farmers diversify crop varieties117. IDPs 
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living with rural communities are often hired to help work as a cheap source of labor118. In urban 
cities petty trade, labor, and prostitution become common livelihood strategies119.  
 
 
International Frameworks for Internal Displacement 
It was not until the 1990’s that internal displacement was recognized as not only a humanitarian 
issue but also a human rights one120. IDPs are not afforded any special rights as they have not 
crossed an international border; however, their rights are protected under international human 
rights law and humanitarian law.  It is the responsibility of the nation state to ensure these rights 
under the norms of sovereignty; however, nation states inability or lack of willingness to protect 
and provide for vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, often causes NGOs and humanitarian 
organizations to step in to meet their needs121.  
 
The primary guideline for IDP rights and protection is the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (1998), the guidelines are based on international human rights and humanitarian 
law and were unanimously approved by the UN Commission and General Assembly. The 
document is non-binding, as nations were not consulted in the creation of the document.  The 
Guiding Principles cover: rights against displacement, the rights of the displaced, obligations of 
States and humanitarian organizations, and durable solutions to displacement. Principle 3 of the 
Guiding Principles stipulates that it is the State who has “the primary duty and responsibility to 
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their 
jurisdiction122.” Principle 25 reiterates the obligations of the State to provide for IDPs also 
stating that humanitarian organizations can also supply assistance, which the State should 
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allow123.  This is problematic in countries that are unable or unwilling to provide for and protect 
their IDP populations. The Congolese military forces have violated many of the principles, while 
it remains difficult to say if they did so on government orders or simply acting on their own 
accord it is clear that at the very least the Congolese government remains unable to protect the 
country’s IDPs.  
 
Within the Guiding Principles framework, protection not only encompasses physical security but 
also social, economic and political rights. Under the cluster system, the UNHCR leads the global 
protection cluster and is the co-lead of the emergency shelter and camp coordination/ 
management cluster124.  Even when international actors, such as the UNHCR step in, the ability 
to provide adequate protection is often limited. Research by Bagshaw and Paul found that despite 
the UN’s rights-based approach to the protection of IDPs, in practice it “is still largely ad hoc 
and driven more by the personalities and convictions of individuals on the ground than by an 
institutional, system wide agenda125.” The research also found that senior UN officials remained 
reluctant to adequately advocate for the rights of IDPs126.  
 
Regional legislation on human rights provides legal norms that extend to IDPs.  The African 
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Right’s (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and 
Displaced Persons provides IDPs within African nations with legal rights relating to 
displacement127.  The Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced 
Persons was established by the ACHPR in 2004 with the mandate of conducting research and 
fact-finding missions on refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers in order to assist in the development 
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of effective strategies and policies128. The DRC is party to the ACHPR and while a observation 
mission by the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and IDPs has not been 
conducted129, the DRC does report to the ACHPR on it’s human rights developments.  
 
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed the “Guidance on Profiling Internally 
Displaced Persons,” in 2008 to provide a standard methodology for humanitarian actors to 
identify IDPs and collect data on displacement, humanitarian and protections needs, and 
potential solutions130. The IASC also developed the “Framework on Durable Solutions for 
Internally Displaced Persons in 2010. According to the framework, a durable solution is: 
Achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that 
are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights 
without discrimination resulting from their displacement131.  
 The framework identifies return, local integration, and resettlement in another part of the 
country as possible durable solutions for IDPs. According to the framework, it is the 
responsibility of the government to provide durable solutions for IDPs, at minimum authorities 
must ensure minimum legal and policy frameworks for IDP rights and government mechanisms 
are able to facilitate humanitarian assistance132. IDPs have the right to voluntarily choose what 
solution they would like under the framework. 
 
 The IASC framework promotes a community-based approach that mitigates tensions between 
the displaced and host communities133. The IASC notes that factors including the ability of the 
local community to absorb IDPs, availability of natural resources, livelihood opportunities, and 
infrastructure, and environmental sustainability may affect durable solutions134. A durable 
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solution requires adequate and sustainable access to: essential food and water, basic shelter, 
sanitation, primary school education, and essential medical services135. According to the 
framework durable solutions have been achieved when IDPs can access public services on an 
equal level as locals with comparable needs136.  Likewise, while IDPs have the right to meet their 
core economic needs, livelihoods are relative, in that IDPs should have the same access to 
employment as local residents137. 
 
 In order to determine durable solutions for IDPs in eastern DRC, their current conditions within 
host communities must be assessed to determine the communities’ capacity to absorb the 
population for the possibility of integration. Land rights must also be examined, as the displaced 
return and try to reclaim their homes. The land laws in the DRC are outdated and ill equipped for 
the current crisis. In practice land is generally owned and transferred according to customary 
law; however, the state only recognizes ownership and land certificates issued by the states 
property administration office138. Large-scale land sales in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories 
have already sparked outcry by IDPs and the local population139.  Within Bukavu, the issue of 
land is pitting the local government against residents of a slum on the road between the Bukavu 
and Panzi. While initially allowed to build and live on the land, the government has now 
reclaimed it to widen the road, demolishing the homes and shops on the route140. Inevitably, land 
will be a contentious issue in the future.  If the government fails to resolve the disconnect 
between traditional land ownership and government Ministry of Land Affairs policies durable 
solutions will be difficult to achieved.    
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Chapter IV: Methods 
The purpose of this research is to explore the displacement experience of those living in the 
eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) based on primary research. This 
section describes the research methods utilized, ethical and practical challenges, and types of 
data analysis employed. This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
the American University in Cairo. 
Figure 3.1: Map of South Kivu 
DATA COLLECTION  
For this research, interviews were carried out in 
the urban setting of the South Kivu provincial 
capital, Bukavu, and in the rural town of 
Mudaka, located 35 km north of Bukavu (Figure 
3.1). An urban city and rural town were chosen 
to identify the differences in experiences 
between IDP’s living in different host 
communities. Mudaka was selected as the 
location for the rural interviews as it was easily 
accessible from Bukavu, is relatively safe, and I 
had access to the IDP community within the 
town. The interviews occurred in December 2011 and January 2012. A leader of a local 
community based organization (CBO) facilitated my access to the IDP communities in both 
Bukavu and Mudaka. The facilitation of the interviews by a local CBO leader, who was trusted 
within the communities, was key to identifying willing participants. Non-probability, snowball 
sampling was utilized as IDPs are not easily identifiable and maybe hesitant to participate in 
research conducted by an unknown foreigner. Furthermore, insecurity prohibited the possibility 
of accessing a probability sample. Due to time restrictions, interviews were unable to be carried 
out with humanitarian actors.  
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Semi-structured interviews were utilized based on an interview guide consisting of 20 open-
ended questions (see appendix). Using the back translation method, a professional outside 
translator was hired to translate the English guide into Mashi, Kiswahili, and French. The three 
translated versions were then presented to the three translators that would be carrying out the 
interviews to translate the interview guide back to English to ensure the translation was as close 
as possible to the original translation. The Mashi141 version particularly benefited from this 
process, as the language is less common than Kiswahili and French. Having a translator whose 
primary language is Mashi was beneficial, particularly while conducting interviews in Mudaka.  
 
All participants voluntarily agreed to participate in the interview. Before the interviews, all 
participants were provided with an informed consent form in the language of their preference. 
An oral consent form was also read aloud for any illiterate participants. All interviews were 
conducted in private rooms, to avoid the third-party-present effect. The third-party-present effect 
occurs when interviews occur in the presence of a third-party is present in the room142. This can 
be particularly problematic when interviewing conflict-affected persons. 
 
Interpreters were utilized to conduct interviews in French, Kiswahili, and Mashi. All of the 
interpreters possessed previous experience working with vulnerable populations. Additionally, 
they were required to sign a confidentially agreement. About one-fourth of all the interviews 
were carried out by the author of the article with the aid of an interpreter.  
 
 In Bukavu, 31 interviews were conducted and 19 were conducted in Mudaka, for a total sample 
size of 50 interviews. The size difference between Bukavu and Mudaka can be attributed to the 
number of participants that were available for the interview session and met necessary criteria, 
namely being displaced and above 18 years old. Of the 31participants in Bukavu, 13 were male 
and 18 were female. At Mudaka only five participants were male and the remaining 14 were 
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female. The total sample consisted of 34 females and 18 males. The age range of participants 
was 18 to 81 years old. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS  
Semi-structured interviews were chosen to provide descriptive statistics, in addition to qualitative 
analysis. The research does not provide a fully representative sample, but highlights individual 
experiences while employing descriptive statistics to note patterns and trends within the research 
sample. As the research was exploratory, grounded theory was utilized to find trends and patterns 
that emerged in the data.  According to Glen Bowen, grounded theory method is inductive as 
“the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis come from the data” gathered143. After 
reviewing the data three themes of the displacement experience of research participants that 
clearly emerged during interviews. The identified aspects of displacement that will be analyzed 
are:  
• The reason for fleeing (generalized violence or personally targeted); 
• The experience during flight (cycles of displacement, other locations of 
refuge, and mode of travel); 
• The self-settlement experience (reason for refuge in current community, 
livelihood strategy, relations with host community, and desire to return 
home).  
 
CHALLENGES AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Carrying out research of conflict-affected persons within insecure regions requires the highest 
levels of ethics, as well as provisions of protection and security. Many witnesses and actors in 
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32	  
	  
the conflict in the DRC refuse to share their experiences144. This is in part due to the potential 
reprisal one may face for testifying, making silence a form of self-protection145. In eastern DRC, 
conflict-affected civilians are more likely to identify foreign rebel groups as perpetrators of 
violence than Congolese military forces or local rebel groups. Additionally, impunity is 
widespread so many civilians do not believe there is a point to testifying or reporting violent 
crime. 
 
Fear of reprisal for speaking out, as well as stigma likely decreased the likelihood of respondents 
reporting acts of sexual violence. Similarly, as all of the interpreters were male, female 
participants may have been less likely to report sexual violence during the interviews. All of the 
interpreters have past experience working with survivors of sexual violence but as interviews 
were conducted over one day it is unlikely that they could gain the full trust of the participants. 
As the research focused on displacement, not sexual violence, under reporting of sexual violence 
is unlikely to change the accuracy findings of the research. Anonymity and security are of the 
utmost importance for any research, but particularly so in such an environment. Anonymity was 
ensured to protect all participants.  
 
Conducting research in impoverished communities also presents challenges; particularly where 
ones skin color may associate them with Western nations creates situations where the researcher 
is constantly managing economic inequality146. In eastern DRC, foreigners are easily identified 
by external features and are referred to as muzungu, meaning one who wonders aimlessly. 
Westerners are commonly perceived to be wealthy and it is not unusual to receive requests for 
goods and money. This is particularly problematic when conducting research for a few reasons. 
First, research participants may expect compensation for their time which may increase the 
likelihood that the participants respond by saying what they believe the researcher would like to 
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hear, known as the deference effect. Secondly, the interaction of the participant with a Westerner 
may lead others in the community to suspect the participant of receiving money, potentially 
increasing the possibility of the participant being robbed.  
 
Aware these challenges, I conferred with Congolese experienced in conducting research in the 
region for advice in developing a strategy to minimize such risks. A local NGO employee 
warned against visiting any participants’ homes. According to the source, a local Congolese who 
allowed for a researcher to interview them within their home was robbed afterwards as the 
robbers suspected they must have received money from the researcher. For this reason I choose 
to conduct my interviews at community centers, a church in Bukavu and a school in Mudaka. 
This choice created its own problem, as participants required transportation. To address the issue 
of transportation I reimbursed each participant. As public transportation has fixed rates, round-
trip costs were estimated to be USD 1 per person. While I did provide financial reimbursement 
for transportation I was hesitant to provide more financial compensation. However, I did feel it 
was absolutely necessary to consider the needs of the participants as well as the time they were 
taking out of their day to participate. For this reason I provided participants with snacks during 
the interview and a portion of grains to take home with them. Providing remuneration, rather in 
goods or money, is debated among scholars. My approach was based on the needs of the 
participants.   
 
In the DRC compensation is common and can be expected, this can be problematic for 
researchers as deference is common. Word spread around Mudaka that a Western researcher was 
coming causing many non-IDPs to come to the school claiming to be displaced and requesting 
participation in the research. This was addressed in two ways. The local contact that had 
identified local IDPs for participation had a list of those he whose participation he had requested. 
Additionally, noting that some individuals who had shown up but were not on the lists were 
IDPs, a translator from the region vetted those who were not on the lists to identify IDPs. Those 
not on the list were asked where they were from and using the local language of the region they 
identified questioned on key landmarks of their village or town. The process was messy and 
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certainly not ideal but given the unexpected circumstances it allowed for the participation of 
more interviewees while removing deference from those falsely claiming to fit the participation 
criteria.   
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Chapter V: Analysis and Discussion: 
 Identifying Displacement in South Kivu 
 
Chapter IV explained the methods utilized to conduct this research; this chapter examines the 
research findings. In this chapter I will utilize descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis to 
examine the research findings. As discussed in the methods sections, three phases of the 
displacement experience were identified using grounded theory. The phases that will be analyzed 
in this section are: 
 
The aim of the section is to shed light on patterns and trends that were identified during these 
phases of displacement. The themes will be examined in terms of the overall findings, 
differences and similarities between respondents in Bukavu and Mudaka, as well as individual 
experiences in order to provide a multi-dimensional analysis. In highlighting trends we attain a 
glimpse of the experiences of the current 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the 
DRC. It is important to note that since this research was carried out in December 2011 and 
January 2012, the number of IDPs in Congo has increased by almost 25% from the estimated 1.8 
that were displaced during the time of research147. This increase means further strains on every 
level of society in the eastern region. It will become evident in this chapter that displacement 
creates burdens not only on the displaced but on host families and communities, as well as the 
economy.  The examination of these phases provides a research-based perspective on the plight 
of IDPs living outside of displacement camps in the South Kivu province of DRC.   
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Profile of Participants 
Thirty-one interviews were conducted in Bukavu and 19 interviews were conducted in Mudaka, 
creating a total of 50 participants. Of the 50 interviews carried out 18 of the participants were 
male and 32 were female. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 81 years of age. Using the 
villages which respondents were from, the territory that the village is located within was also 
identified (Table 5.1). Participants came from the Kabare, Kalehe, Mwenga, and Walungu 
territories of South Kivu. Forty-two percent of the participants were from the village of Nindja in 
the Kabare territory and 16% were from the village of Kalonge in the Kalehe territory. The rest 
of the participants came from various other villages. The identification of participants’ villages 
of origin is important in identifying wider military and rebel operations in those territories, as 
well as identifying trends in population movements.   
 
Table 5.1: Villages and Territories of Respondents 
Village, Territory Frequency Percent 
Bideka, Walungu 1 2 
Bunyakiri, Kalehe 4 8 
Chocholo, Unknown 1 2 
Ikoma, Kabare 2 4 
Kabare, Kabare 3 6 
Kahuzi, Kabare 1 2 
Kalonge, Kalehe 8 16 
Kanyola, Walungu 3 6 
Kasika, Mwenga 1 2 
Mogo, Kabare 1 2 
Ngweshe, Walungu 1 2 
Nindja, Kabare 21 42 
Nyamubanda, Unknown 1 2 
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Walungu, Walungu 1 2 
Unknown 1 2 
  Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.  
 
Of the participants, 48% self-identified as belonging to the Mushi ethnic group, 42% identified 
as belonging to the Bashi ethnic group, while the remaining participants self-identified with other 
groups (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: Respondents Ethnic Groups 
Ethnic Group Frequency Percent 
Bakunaushi 1 2 
Bashbesha 1 2 
Bashi 21 42 
Batembo 1 2 
Murengeronge 1 2 
Mushi 24 48 
Unknown 1 2 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.  
 
The majority (68%) of participants were married and only 4% reported being single. Nine 
respondents (18%) reported being widowed, two female respondents reported being abandoned 
and one female reported being divorced (Table 5.3).  All of the nine respondents who reported 
being widows were females. Six of the widows reported that their husbands were killed during 
attacks on their village. One widow stated that her husband was abducted by the Interhamwe to 
carry goods for them and later killed. 
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Table 5.3: Marital Status of Respondents 
Marital Status Frequency Percent 
Single 4 8 
Married 34 68 
Widowed 9 18 
Abandoned 2 4 
Divorced 1 2 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012 
 
The number of children each participant had ranged from none to 10, the figures included 
deceased children. The mean number of children per participant was 5.24 with a median of 5. Of 
the participants, 20% (10) reported the death of one or more of their children. Nine of the 10 
respondents that reported the death of a child stated that their child or children were killed during 
attacks on their homes and villages. The remaining respondent did not specify the cause of death 
of their children. Three of the interview participants had adopted a relative’s orphan(s). 
 
Cause of Displacement 
This section examines the cause and year of displacement to determine if displaced are fleeing 
due to generalized violence or targeted attacks. It will assess the types of violence experienced to 
understand the reason that respondents chose to flee. Additionally, it will examine insecurity in 
the region during periods that experienced increased conflict.  
 
Time Frame of Displacement 
Displacement of respondents occurred over a 16 year period between 1994 and 2010 (Figure 
5.1). The highest rates of displacement of participants occurred in 2004, 2006, and 2010. Each of 
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these years corresponds with surges in violence related to military and/or NSAGs offensives. In 
2004 South Kivu plunged into chaos as the military battled against Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Democratie- Goma (RCD-Goma)148, led by Laurent Nakunda for control of Bukavu. The 
city fell to Nakunda’s forces on June 2, 2004. It is estimated that there were 2.3 million IDPs in 
the DRC in 2004149.  In 2006 government forces, with the support of the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) carried 
out offensives against rebel groups, including RCD-Goma, in the Kivus. At this time there were 
1.1 million IDPs150. Displacement during 2010 corresponds with anti-Forces Democratiques du 
Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)151 military campaigns carried out by the Forces Armees de la 
Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC)152 with MONUC support. These operations were 
highly criticized due to the enormous civilian toll and limited success against the FDLR. Amani 
Leo, meaning peace today in Kiswahili, the third anti-FDLR campaign was launched in the 
Kivus in January 2010. During government campaigns against them, the FDLR are known to 
retaliate by increasing their attacks on civilian populations153. The same year saw a rate of 1.7 
million internally displaced154. 
 
This research indicates that displacement increases during military campaigns. This creates a 
humanitarian dilemma, if agencies are uninformed of military operations they will be unable to 
predict humanitarian needs and rapidly deploy; however, if they are perceived as coordinating 
with the military they will no longer be viewed as impartial155. The case of Amani Leo operations 
resulting in retaliation indicates a need for increased protection efforts during military 
campaigns. As the current United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the D.R. Congo 
(MONUSCO) already coordinates with the FARDC and includes a mandate on civilian 
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protection, the mission should review the 2009 and 2010 military campaigns to identify failures 
in coordinating protection with the FARDC. While humanitarian agencies are paralyzed by the 
dilemma of coordinating with military campaigns, the damage of impartiality has already been 
done to MONUSCO due to previous support during FDLR campaigns. In spite of this mistrust, 
the organization should examine the protection failures during the 2009 and 2010 military 
campaigns and use their relationship with the military to develop mechanisms for coordinating 
protection and humanitarian responses during military campaigns.   
 
Figure 5.1: Year Displaced from Home 
 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
Reason for Flight 
Within the dataset two reasons for fleeing were identified: 
• Those who fled because they and/or a member of their nuclear or extended family were 
targeted by an armed group, I refer to this as experiencing a direct attack; 
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• Those who fled because their village was being targeted by an armed group but they did 
not report being directly targeted, I will refer to this as generalized violence.  
Sixty-six percent of participants reported fleeing their village due to an armed group targeting 
themselves or a member of their nuclear or extended family, while 34% fled due to generalized 
violence within their village (Table 5.4)156.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Reason for Fleeing 
 Frequency Percent 
Directly Attacked 33 66 
Generalized Violence 17 34 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
The types of attacks reported by respondents included: abductions, looting, sexual violence, 
beatings and torture, murders and massacres, and the burning of houses. Many of these tactics 
would be used together during attacks, resulting in forced displacement of the targeted civilian 
population. The types of attacks reported include those reported by participants who directly 
experienced attacks, as well as those who did not personally experience attacks but reported 
generalized violence.  
 
Looting 
Thirteen of the respondents mentioned looting and pillaging of their villages by armed groups. 
According to Human Rights Watch, looting and pillaging are common aspects of attacks on 
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villages157. During the RCD-Goma 2004 offense in South Kivu, the rebel group was nicknamed 
“operation TDF,” standing for operation telephones, dollars and daughters, as these were the 
demands of the rebels when they would break into the homes of civilians158. Looting and 
pillaging appears to be one way that armed groups sustain themselves, as one man explained: 
 During the war Hutu soldiers were killing, raping and taking everything including our 
cows and goats. 
Looting was sometimes used in combination with sexual violence and/or killings. According to 
one participant from Nindja (Kabare territory): 
I left my village because of different rebel groups were oppressing the people 
there. Kidnapping, looting, and sexual abuse were all orders of the day. 
Another respondent from Nindja (Kabare territory) explained: 
Every day the Interhamwe came and demanded things which we didn’t have. 
When you didn’t have what they asked for they would kill you. 
 
Looting and pillaging pose a double threat to civilian populations. As one woman from Kabare 
told: 
Mai-Mai and Interhamwe were looting and pillaging every day in our village and 
took everything we needed to live. When we ran out of things for them they began 
killing people. We did not wait to be killed, so we ran away. 
For armed groups looting is a tactic for directly improving a group’s immediate economic 
situation159. The affect of frequent and repeated looting depletes civilian resources creating a 
daily struggle to survive. Looting alone can cause economic vulnerability but when coupled with 
threats of violence and murder becomes a source of economic and physical insecurity.  
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Abductions 
Two types of abductions were identified within the dataset. The first is a common tactic of armed 
groups in eastern Congo, abduction for labor. One of the most common forms of this is armed 
groups kidnapping civilians to port goods, weapons, and equipment for them. This often occurs 
following large-scale looting when the perpetrators cannot carry all of the looted goods. Men 
who are abducted for this reason are often killed after or are never heard from again. As one 
respondent explained: 
The Interhamwe came and attacked my village. Then they took my husband with 
them and forced him to carry things for them, after they killed him. 
Another respondent described the different uses for males and females who were abducted: 
I left Kalonge in 2002, it was very dangerous at this time. Rebels would come to 
the village and kidnap boys who they would make carry their supplies. They also 
would take girls that they used for sex. During this time my girlfriend was taken 
by the rebels. She was held for two weeks before escaping. 
I choose to include the abduction of girls and women into this category as well, as opposed to in 
the sexual violence category which this could also fit under. While they are often labeled as ‘sex 
slaves’ because in a large part that is what they are used for, the term fails to account for the 
other forms of exploitation they face. Meredith Turshen asserts that during conflict “systemic 
rape and sexual violence are among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from 
women.160” Building from Turshen’s argument that women hold productive value to armed 
groups, we must make note of the fact that females who are abducted and subjected to sexual 
violence are also forced to cook, clean, acts as porters, fetch water and firewood, etc161. Armed 
groups violently take and use females both sexually as well as a source of forced labor. One 
respondent accounted how she escaped her abductors after being sent to fetch water for them:  
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I was kidnapped by the rebels and became theirs [sex slave] for three years. One 
day I went to fetch water alone. When I arrived at the river, I took the advantage 
of running away from them through the way of the river. I was so scared they 
would catch me and kept wondering what would happen if they did. 
The second form of abduction that appeared in the dataset was kidnapping for ransom. Both the 
FARDC162 and NSAG’s are known to carry out extortion and taxation of the local populations 
under their control. I was unfamiliar with the practice of kidnapping for ransom by armed groups 
in South Kivu, expect in cases targeting foreigners. Oxfam identified kidnapping for ransom as a 
threat to civilians in the Orientale Province in 2011163. This research suggests that it was also 
occurring in South Kivu, as one respondent reported being abducted from Chocholo in 2000 and 
being held for two weeks until family members paid a ransom. Another respondent from Nindja 
explained how his son was abducted in 2007: 
My son was taken by the Interhamwe who demanded I give them $200 within 24 
hours for his release. I managed to get the money and pay them but they came 
back again to try to rape my wife. Fortunately, she was in the field when they 
came.  
All forms of abduction found in the dataset provide the perpetrators with economic gains, rather 
in the case of cash ransoms or through forced labor. While it is impossible to know the intent of 
the perpetrators, abductions and looting are providing them with economic resources. Further 
research would need to be conducted to determine the extent of these economic benefits for 
NSAGs. For the civilian population the threat of abduction is a threat to one’s life and livelihood 
and thus a cause of fleeing.  
 
Sexual Violence 
Sexual violence was one of the most common types of attacks respondents mentioned; however, 
few reported being directly affected by sexual violence. Sexual violence in endemic in the DRC, 
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according to a study by the American Journal of Public Health, an estimated 1,100 women were 
raped every day between 2006 and 2007164. Twenty-two participants cited sexual violence as part 
of their reason for leaving their village, two told of personal experiences, and one spoke of his 
wife’s experience. Congolese are deeply conservative and despite the prevalence and 
normalization of sexual violence, a very strong stigma is till attached to survivors. It is possible 
that more participants had personal experiences with sexual violence but choose not to discuss it 
during interviews. Sexual violence in the DRC destroys social ties of families and communities 
as husbands leave their wives, families abandoned their children, and babies conceived by rape 
are rejected165.  
 
Beatings and Torture 
Beatings and torture are both utilized by armed groups in eastern DRC. In some cases they occur 
when a civilian refuses to give the armed group goods or act as a porter for them, in other cases 
they occur with no apparent reason166. One research participant told of how soldiers beat his 
wife, breaking both of her hands. Another respondent recounted the types of horrors rebels 
carried out in Nindja: 
At night you would hear a knock at the door and it would be rebels there to loot 
and rape. I witnessed beheadings, breast being cut off, rapes. They killed my 
husband and two of my children. 
 
Murders and Massacres 
Nineteen of the research participants had at least one relative that was killed by an armed group. 
Some lost one or two family members, while others lost their entire family. One respondent fled 
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after the May 2005 massacre in Nindja where he was residing. Another respondent described the 
killings of multiple members of her family: 
Interhamwe came and killed my mother and father. Then they slit the throats of 
two of my children and burned our house down.  
In two cases, the respondents were young children when their village was attacked and families 
killed. One was only two years old when his parents were killed. The other, who was 13 when 
his family was murdered, described how he managed to escape the same fate: 
Rebels came to my house and killed my parents and 11 siblings. I pretended to be 
asleep and the rebels thought that I was dead as well. 
 
Burning of Houses 
Eleven participants reported that armed groups had burned down their homes. The burning of 
houses is particularly relevant when looking at displacement, as it is one of the clearest forms of 
forced displacement. Human Rights Watch has documented the burning of over 9,000 homes, 
schools, churches, and other buildings in North and South Kivu167. In many cases it is nearly 
impossible to identify the reason of armed groups attacking a particular village. In some cases 
land control appears to be a critical factor. This motive was evident by the forced displacement 
of one particular ethnic group in 2006 by the CNDP who then repopulated the village with 
CNDP constituents168. The burning of houses also appeared to be a tactic utilized by the FDLR 
as reprisal attacks on the civilian population for the military’s anti-FDLR campaigns169. Rather 
respondents were directly targeted or not, these types of attacks on villages amount to intentional 
forced displacement.  
 
Based on the type of violence experienced, regardless if respondents were directly targeted, all of 
the respondents meet the definition of an internally displaced person by the UN’s criteria as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo.” (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2009) 87. 
168 Greta Zeender and Jacob Rothing, “Displacement Trends in DRC” in Forced Migration Review 36, (2010), 10.  
169 Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo.” (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2009), 52. 	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violence occurring was wide-spread and posed a threat to the loss of life. According to Sarah 
Kenyon Lischer, when dealing with conflict-induced displacement, it is important to take into 
consideration both the violence that caused displacement, as well as characteristics of the 
displacement in order to understand how conflict affects displacement and visa-a-versa170. 
Failing to examine both the violence that caused displacement and the displacement crisis 
prevents full understanding of what causes the crises as well as the ability to predict future 
events171. This research indicates that carrying out wide-spread violence against the civilian 
population is a common tactic of armed actors in eastern Congo.  
 
Perpetrators of Attacks 
While this research focused on the displacement experience of the civilians, the identification 
and labeling is relevant to exploring the violence that caused displacement. Adapting Lischer’s 
argument on the need to consider both the violence that induced displacement as well as the 
displacement, I believe it is also important to include the identified perpetrators of violence. 
Understanding the perceptions and identities of perpetrators is also necessary for understanding 
the conflict itself. Additionally, the identities of perpetrators are not only relevant for any future 
justice and/or reconciliation efforts but also to the success of durable solutions.  
 
Of the participants, 50% identified Interhamwe as carrying out attacks on their village and 20% 
said that “rebel groups” were responsible for attacks (Table 5.5). Interhamwe has become a 
catch-all term in eastern Congo. The term originates back to the paramilitary group involved in 
the Rwandan genocide but is now often used for NSAGs that include remnants of the original 
Interhamwe, such as the FDLR. It is important to note that those labeled at Interhamwe in eastern 
Congo are not always the same Interhamwe that carried out the Rwandan genocide. It is notable, 
that the most commonly identified groups are often viewed as foreigners: Interhamwe, Hutu, and 
the FDLR. The local Mai Mai militias were less commonly identified and no one identified the 
military as perpetrators, despite widespread documentation of military abuses of civilian 
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143; The case of the influx of Rwandan refugees into the DRC following the 1994 Genocide is a prime example of 
how displacement can affect and cause conflict. 
171 Ibid. 
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populations in the Kivus. This is not surprising as widespread impunity and fear of retaliation 
discourages civilians from speaking out against crimes committed by the military.  
Each armed group presumably has their own agenda and motives but the targeting of civilians is 
a tactic employed by most, if not all of the armed groups in the Kivus, including the military. 
According to Jeremy Weinstein, armed groups that operate in resource rich environments or that 
receive support from an external patron are more likely to commit high levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilian populations172. Weinstein argues that armed groups in resource poor 
areas are less abusive towards the civilian population and use violence more “selectively and 
strategically”173. As discussed in Chapter II, Rwanda, Uganda, and the government of Congo 
have all supported and aligned with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) at various times to fight a 
proxy war174. Not only do many armed groups in eastern Congo have outside patrons but some 
are based in territories with profitable mineral resources. Both of these factors allow armed 
groups to brutalize the civilian population as the groups do not require civilian support to 
operate.  Expanding on Weinstein’s argument based on this research, NSAGs who receive 
external support from patrons and/or operate in resource rich areas of the eastern Congo employ 
high-levels of violence against the civilian populations, particularly in times of military 
campaigns and NSAG offensives. The high-levels of violence in turn spark massive 
displacement of civilians.  
 
 
Table 5.5: Identified Perpetrators of Attacks 
 Frequency Percent 
FDLR 1 2 
Hutu 2 4 
Interhamwe 25 50 
Mai Mai and Hutu 3 6 
Rebel Groups 10 20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172Jemery Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 
2007), 7. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Rwanda has backed the Rally for Democracy (RDC), the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP), 
and M23. Congo has supported various Mai Mai malitias and under Mobutu supported the Interhamwe and ex-
Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR). Uganda backed the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC) and reportedly M23. 
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Unknown 9 18 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
This section explored the conflict and causes of displacement at the micro-level. In analyzing the 
research participants’ experiences with violence, we found that the majority personally 
experienced violence related to the conflict that caused their displacement. As the research 
sample represented four territories within the South Kivu province, we can conclude that the 
insecurity is relatively wide-spread. Additionally, as the displacement of participants increased 
during times of military campaigns and NSAG offenses we can deduct that these operations lead 
to intensifications of direct targeting of civilian populations that in turn results in increases of 
displacement.  
 
 
 Flight: the Search for Refuge 
In the previous section we found violence by NSAGs is responsible for the displacement of 
respondents. This section focuses on the participants experience during flight, as they sought 
refuge. It examines where refuge was initially sought. The section also identifies the modes of 
transport used to reach sites of refugee, as well as the reasoning behind choosing certain sites of 
refuge. Finally, it examines where respondents stayed upon first arrival at their current location 
of refuge. In light of Lischer’s two-pronged approach to examining conflict-induced 
displacement, this section focuses on the displacement crisis caused by NSAGs violence 
described in section 5.2. 
 
Locations of Refuge 
For many respondents their current location of refuge was not the first place they went to after 
fleeing their village. Forty-six percent of the respondents went directly to their current location, 
while the remaining 64% went to one or more locations prior to their current location (Table 
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5.6). Examining the 64% is important as it exposes the diversity in sites of refuge, as well as 
cycles of displacement. Fifteen respondents (30%) went to one village prior to relocating to their 
current location. Many times the village they first sought refuge at was also experiencing 
insecurity. As one respondent from Ngweshe explained: 
First, my family and I went to Kabare but once we were there we heard that the 
Interhamwe were kidnapping children and forcing them to work for them, so we 
then decided to flee to Mudaka.  
Not all who left their first site of refuge did so because of insecurity, as one woman described: 
We first travelled to Bukavu but once we were there we found that life was too 
difficult so we decided to move to Mudaka.  
 
Table 5.6: First Location of Refuge 
 Frequency Percent 
Current Location 23 46 
Bush 5 10 
Another Village 15 30 
Camp 2 4 
Bush & Other Village 1 2 
Bush & 2 Or More Villages 2 4 
Another Village, Home, Another Village 2 4 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
Some respondents reported staying in another village for months or even years during which 
time they would return home to check on security. One man from Kalonge described his 
experience: 
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I left my village in Kalonge in 2002 and went to a village nearby. In 2007 I 
returned to check on my home and security in the village and found that it was 
even less secure. I also learned that rebels kidnapped by girlfriend but she 
managed to escape and was receiving treatment at Panzi hospital in Bukavu. 
After seeing all of this I fled with my family to Bukavu in 2007. In 2009 I returned 
to Kalonge to check on security but found more insecurity. There were dead 
bodies on the ground and my home had been burned. Those who were still staying 
at the village were living in the bush nearby. 
This is not an uncommon experience, as other respondents similarly described trying to wait out 
the insecurity at a village nearby so they could check on their homes and fields. Once they 
decided that security was unlikely to return they would then choose to flee to another site of 
refuge, presumably one further from the violence and insecurity.  
 
Another commonly identified site of refuge was the bush (the jungle). From the dataset refuge in 
the bush was used by some only for sleeping during the night, while others lived there for 
months and even years. As attacks often occurred at night, sleeping in the bush nearby allowed 
civilians to hide from armed groups while maintaining access to their fields. These findings are 
supported by previous investigations by Human Rights Watch that found that many civilians 
choose refuge in the forest because it allows access to food sources and land175. As man from 
Nindja informed: 
For one year before leaving the village we would stay at home and work our 
fields during the day but at night we would go into the bush to sleep. After one 
year of this we fled to Ngweshe. We spent six months there then decided to return 
home and see if it was secure. When we got home we found that it was even more 
insecure so we decided to go to Bukavu. 
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While the bush provided a chance of hiding from armed groups, it was not guaranteed. NSAGs 
movements and attacks often push IDPs further into the bush176. One 71-year-old man from 
Nindja explained: 
We lived in the bush for two years, from 2003 until 2005. While we were in the 
bush we ran into Interhamwe. They raped women and children, beat men, many 
died. At this time there were many people living in the bush. We constantly kept 
moving to try to avoid the Interhamwe. We returned to Nindja and found that 28 
people had been killed, others had their legs chopped off, so we decided to flee to 
Bukavu. 
 
Armed groups are not the only challenges civilians face while living in the bush. A male from 
Nindja described the difficulties: 
It was extremely hard in the bush. There is no food, no house to sleep in, diseases, 
and many other problems. 
One respondent caught Typhoid while living in the bush and another suffered a serious shoulder 
injury that now prevents movement of her right arm. Despite the dangers of life in the bush, the 
decision to leave is not easy. As one participant who spent three years in the bush explained: 
We decided to come into town [Bukavu] because at least here we will die near 
people, rather than in the bush where there is no one. Here we can tell people 
about the situation. 
 
The least common site of refuge among respondents was camps. One respondent reported 
staying at a “military camp” and another stayed at a sporadic camp in Walungu. She said: 
We first went to Walungu, the displaced had made a camp there that we stayed at 
for four months. Church groups gave us materials to make shelters out of but the 
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conditions there were very bad. They were not sanitary. There were no latrines 
and lots of illness.  
One possible reason for displaced avoiding camps is perception of their insecurity due to 
memory of the 1996 attacks on Rwandan refugee camps outside of North Kivu177. 
 
Flight by Foot 
Forty-one participants reported walking to their current site of refuge. For many this was a very 
difficult and dangerous journey that lasted days and in some cases weeks. Some would sleep in 
the bush as night and others would stay in villages along the way. One woman described the 
hardships her family faced during the journey: 
I came by foot with my family. I was pregnant at the time and we faced many 
difficulties on the way, such as thirst, hunger, and fatigue.  
The journey by foot is very insecure, due to the risk of running into armed groups. Many 
respondents told of hiding from armed groups along the way. One woman from Kalonge 
explained:  
The journey was really insecure because many people on the way were being 
arrested by the rebels for no reason. It is by the grace of God that I got here 
safely.  
Another respondent reported: 
The journey was really bad because of our lack of food and water. In addition to 
that, there were criminals’ terrorizing people, taking their money.  
One woman and her husband ran into a group armed men while fleeing Kabare. She described it: 
My husband and I were traveling by foot after we left our village. We ran into 
soldiers on the way who took everything we had. Then they beat my husband and 
I.  
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Reasons for Sites of Refuge 
In examining why participants choose to flee to their current site of refuge, we are provided with 
insight into the reasoning and decision making that occurs during flight. The common reasons 
for choosing their current location of refuge included: security, having a friend or relative living 
in the town, or following others who were fleeing to the town (Table 5.7). The majority reported 
choosing their current location due to relative security. Common words used to describe the 
reason for respondents current locations included: peace, safe, and security. As a woman from 
Nindja explained: 
We came here [Bukavu] because it is safer than home. In Bukavu people still sleep safely 
in their homes. I was also pregnant at the time and Bukavu was the only safe place for me 
to have my baby.  
Many reported choosing Bukavu because they had heard it was safe. Others choose Bukavu as 
they required medical treatment, including one woman who suffered from typhoid and another 
who had been abducted by Interhamwe. Two respondents currently residing in Mudaka 
explained how they first sought refuge in Bukavu but found that life was too difficult there and 
decided to move to Mudaka, these cases illustrate the multiple factors that influence the choice of 
sites for refuge.  
 
Table 5.7: Reason for Current Location of Refuge 
 Frequency Percent 
Security 33 66 
Family/Friends 7 14 
Other 7 14 
Unknown 3 6 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
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Seven respondents chose their current location as they knew a friend or relative there. Similarly, 
McDowell’s research in North Kivu also found that second to security, having friends or family 
of the same ethnic group in a location of refuge was a primary factor in choosing a site of 
refuge178. Family, friends, and members of the same ethnic group are preferred hosts as they are 
seen as being able to provide compassion to displaced, as well as spiritual and emotional 
security179.The reasoning for others varied, a few followed others who were fleeing. This was the 
case for a respondent who was 13 years old when he was forced to flee after his entire family 
was killed. Unaccompanied minors are especially vulnerable during displacement, as armed 
groups forcibly recruit boys and girls are at risk to sexual violence. Upon arriving in Bukavu he 
was taken in by a man who lets him live in the kitchen of his house in exchange for the young 
man (now 18 years old) doing the washing in cleaning. This respondent never got to finish his 
education and is essentially locked into a cycle of servitude in exchange for shelter.  
 
 
Hosts 
Upon first arrival at their current town of refuge, respondents stayed with a variety of hosts 
(Table 5.8). Eighteen respondents stayed with a relative and six stayed with friends, some of the 
time the hosts were neighbors and relatives from the same village who had fled prior to the 
respondents. Ten participants reported staying with strangers upon their initial arrival. As one 
man from Kasika stated: 
When I arrived here [Bukavu] a man of good will felt mercy upon me and 
welcomed me and my family into his house. He let us stay there until I was able to 
rent a small house. 
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Table 5.8: Host upon First Arrival at Current Location 
 Frequency Percent 
Community Center 8 16 
Friend 6 12 
Other 2 4 
Relative 18 36 
Stranger 10 20 
Unknown 6 12 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
Two respondents were hosted by the chief of Mudaka upon their initial arrival at the village. 
Eight respondents stayed at community centers upon their arrival, churches were the most 
common type community centers. The remaining two respondents stayed at hospitals for medical 
treatment upon their arrival. The length of stay with hosts varied from weeks to years. Hosting 
displaced families depletes the host family’s resources; this can result in the vulnerability of not 
only the displaced by the host as well180. As a man who stayed with a host family explained: 
A relative allowed me to stay at his house when I arrived but then his resources 
ran low and I had to find somewhere else. Since then I try to rent my own house 
but sometimes I cannot pay rent and am kicked out.  
 
In this section we found that IDPs seek refuge in a variety of locations. Many seek refuge in the 
bush risking hardship and the threat of armed groups in order to remain close to their resources 
and land. Others seek refuge in village close to their homes where they can also check on their 
homes. The persistence of insecurity eventually pushed respondents who sought refuge in these 
locations to move further away from their homes to locations with greater security. Economic 
factors greatly contribute to choices of refuge, as evident by the reluctance to move away from 
ones home and resources, as well as in cases where respondents moved from Bukavu to Mudaka 
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because of economic hardships. While security was the primary reason for seeking refuge in 
Mudaka and Bukavu, networks of family and friends also drew respondents to the locations. 
Family and friends of the displaced served as hosts upon their initial arrival. IDPs who did not 
know anyone in the site of refuge relied on strangers and community centers to host them.  
 
 
 Settlement Experience 
This section examines the current experience of participants. As the latest date of displacement 
for any participant was 2010, all of the research participants had been displaced for over one 
year. The term settlement is used loosely here, as this section will demonstrate the respondents 
continue to face daily struggles in their current location. A variety of aspects relating to the 
displaced current situation are analyzed including: access to humanitarian assistance, current 
residence, and livelihood strategies. Additionally, the section examines perceptions of relations 
with host community and life in current location. It concludes by analyzing the respondents 
desire to return to their home and discusses the dilemma of durable solutions. 
 
Access to Assistance 
As interviews were not conducted with aid organizations, this section is based on the information 
provided by IDP interview participants. Of the participants only three respondents (6%) reported 
ever receiving any humanitarian assistance, either in the form of medical treatment or a food 
ration. None of the respondents were currently receiving support from NGO’s, further research 
would need to be conducted to determine if IDP’s are reaching out for assistance and being 
denied or if IDPs are not attempting to contact organizations for support. Some participants 
reported occasionally receiving support from local churches. NGO’s often report their lack of 
access to displaced populations in eastern Congo, citing:  insecurity, restricted access by armed 
groups, and lack of infrastructure. This research indicates that humanitarian aid is also limited in 
the urban setting of Bukavu, as well as the town of Mudaka. Bukavu is the base for many NGO’s 
and UN agencies so the lack of physical access does not account for the absence of assistance. 
Additionally, Bukavu is relatively secure, debunking any security related reasons for inability to 
access displaced within the city. Similarly, Mudaka is easily accessed via road from Bukavu and 
is also relatively secure. Further investigations need to be carried out to find out why 
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communities like these that are home to IDPs are overlooked by humanitarian and government 
actors. Lack of funding and difficulties of targeting of likely contribute to lack of assistance; 
however, these difficulties do not negate the needs of IDPs living in Bukavu and Mudaka.   
 
Residence  
Eighty-six percent of respondents lived with their families at the time of research, while 6% live 
in a friend’s home (Table 5.9). Often extended families, consisting of grandparents, aunts, 
uncles, etc., would live together; this was particularly common in cases where the respondent 
was widowed. These types of arrangements allow for the pooling of resources. The remaining 
participants either live with strangers or at a community center. In all of these cases the 
respondent was still residing with the same host from their initial arrival. 
 
Being able to secure personal residence is a challenge for most displaced and many face possible 
eviction due to finances. As one man residing in Bukavu explained: 
I am currently living with my family in a small rented house but in a few days we 
will be kicked out because I have no money for rent. 
While most of the respondents have been able to secure their own residence, it is certainly a 
challenge. Generally, IDPs own their own homes and land in their villages but upon settling in 
Mudaka or Bukavu they must have the financial resources in order to rent a home. This is a 
dilemma given that IDPs often lose their primary resources and livelihoods during displacement. 
As IDPs do not receive humanitarian assistance they are left to their own devices to secure both 
shelter and food.   
 
Table 5.9: Currently Residing With 
 Frequency Percent 
Family 43 86 
Friends 3 6 
Strangers 3 6 
Community Centers 1 2 
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Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
The perception of relations with the host community varied based on personal experiences, with 
most reporting good relations. Others commented that relations were “not as needed” or had 
“some problems.” As one widow residing in Mudaka explained: 
I don’t have a house so my children live with different relatives. It is really not 
good though; they [the relatives] blame and mistreat us. 
Problems with hosts likely stem from the draining of household resources during extended 
periods of hosting.  
 
 
Livelihood Strategies 
Agriculture plays a central pillar in the DRC. Within South Kivu, 83.3% of rural households rely 
on farming and agricultural related activities as their primary livelihood181. For many displaced 
leaving their homes results in a loss of livelihood strategy as most rely on agricultural 
production. Following displacement many IDPs are forced to adapt new livelihood strategies.  
According to the research dataset, working as a porter or as a cultivator for other people are the 
two most common livelihood strategies (Table 5.10). Other livelihood strategies reported were 
coded as formal, informal, relying on charity, or those without a livelihood strategy. For these 
purposes formal was classified as those working for a large business that would likely be 
registered with the government182, such as working as a security guard at a school. Informal was 
classified as those working for others who are unlikely to be registered with the government or 
working independently. Both porting and cultivating others land would be considered as 
informal. Other examples of participants’ informal livelihood strategies include: cooking, 
cleaning, selling goods at the market, and providing religious services to others.   
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Table 5.10: Livelihood Strategies 
 Frequency Percent 
Charity 2 4 
Cultivator – Other Peoples Land 11 22 
None 13 26 
Other - Formal 2 4 
Other - Informal 8 16 
Porter 13 26 
Unknown 1 2 
Total 50 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
Notable differences in livelihood strategies in Bukavu and Mudaka were identified in the dataset. 
In Bukavu, the majority of respondents worked as porters and two respondents worked in the 
formal sector (Table 5.11), this contrasts with Mudaka, where none of the participants worked in 
the formal sector (Table 5.12). Porters in Bukavu do the work that pack animals are used for in 
most other developing countries; the load can vary from carrying one large bag of Cassava to the 
market for someone or pulling a cart with hundreds of pounds of wood on it. This type of work 
contrasts Mudaka where the majority of participants worked as cultivators on other people’s 
land. No one from Bukavu reported working as a cultivator or any livelihood strategy related to 
agriculture. Similarly, no one from Mudaka reported working as a porter. 
 
The differences between Bukavu and Mudaka likely stem from the different economies of the 
towns. Compared to Bukavu, Mudaka is rural. Much of Mudaka’s local economy is based on 
agricultural production. Bukavu on the other hand is the largest urban center in South Kivu. It is 
a center for trade, as well as the provincial hub of government, UN, and NGO offices.  During 
the 1990’s, Bukavu experienced a significant expansion in population size, growing from 
100,000 people to over one million183. Insecurity in the province since the mid-1990’s likely 
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contributed to this urbanization, as people sought refuge in the city. The continued growth of 
Bukavu has led to the over-saturation of the job market, making even informal work irregular. 
For the urban IDPs, access to land within the city and surrounding slums is impossible due to the 
lack of available land as well as financial resources to purchase or rent land. The lack of access 
to agricultural livelihoods leads many to adopt informal livelihood strategies. Another problem 
with informal livelihood strategies, such as porting, in urban areas is that they are often limited to 
subsistence survival, meaning they only provide enough income to cover the minimal needs for 
survival. Organizations are implementing livelihood training programs, as well as micro-finance 
programs to address the needs. However, livelihood problems persist due to the inability to 
provide assistance to all of those in need.  
 
Table 5.11: Livelihood Strategies in Bukavu 
 Frequency Percent 
Porter 13 41.9 
Other – Informal 3 9.7 
Other – Formal 2 6.5 
None 10 32.3 
Charity 2 6.5 
Unknown 1 3.2 
Total 31 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012.	  
 
Table 5.12: Livelihood Strategies in Mudaka  
 Frequency Percent 
Cultivator – Other Peoples Land 11 57.9 
Other – Informal 5 26.3 
None 3 15.8 
Total 19 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
62	  
	  
Elderly and those with health problems are often unable to work, leaving them dependent on 
family members and charity. As one 71-year-old man residing in Bukavu explained: 
I am old and my leg is bad so I cannot work. My children work as laborers 
[porters] and they help support me.  
A 70-year-old woman had been residing in a church in Mudaka since her arrival there 
almost two years prior. Unable to work, she relied on charity and “the grace of God” to 
survive.  
 
Life in Host Communities: Physical Security at What Cost? 
When participants were asked about life in their current location, the answers varied but were 
over-whelming negative. The biggest commonality of all the responses was hardships related to 
finances including: school fees, rent, and food insecurity. As one woman residing in Bukavu 
explained: 
Life here is very difficult. My children don’t study because there is no money to 
pay school. There is no joy in my heart because I am suffering, we even miss food. 
Participants in Mudaka reported similar problems. One woman informed: 
Life here is difficult, we cannot afford school, doctors, or clothes; and we often do 
not have food.  
 
Participant responses on the security of their current location of residence also varied greatly and 
depended upon the respondents’ personal definition of security. For some it was considered 
secure because attacks by armed groups are unlikely, for others with a wider definition of 
security, insecurity remained. Many spoke of not only of safety but also economic insecurity, as 
one woman residing in Mudaka stated: 
I do feel safe here but part of the problem is that I have no job so I cannot provide 
for my family sufficiently. We do not have enough food for my family.  
Similar sentiments were expressed by participants in Bukavu. One man explained: 
 It is not safe here at all, there is no stability in poverty. 
One woman residing in Bukavu aptly put it: 
 Bukavu is safer [than Nindja] but here hunger is insecurity. 
One man explained the differences between security in Bukavu and Nindja, where he was from:  
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There is peace in Bukavu but no resources to live; Nindja has resources but no 
peace. 
 
School Fees 
School fees are a problem throughout DRC, while the constitution stipulates that primary 
education is supposed to be free for all children; most families must still pay school fees. Like 
many other government institutions, schools suffer from the same lack of funding, particularly 
for teacher salaries, so families must pay school fees. As most of displaced families are 
struggling to feed and shelter their children, relying on informal work that barely covers 
subsistence survival, school is not an option. The lack of schooling for these children will likely 
force them into the same informal subsistence livelihoods as their parents, creating a cycle of 
poverty.  
 
Interestingly, a few respondents placed their children’s education as a marker of security. One 
woman residing in Mudaka stated: 
 I do not feel safe as long as my children are not in school. 
A male in Bukavu shared similar sentiments explaining: 
 I do not feel safe as long as my children are not studying.  
These responses are very important, as they highlight the participants belief that education can 
bring the next generation security, be it economic or political stability.  
 
 
Rental Economy 
It is important to remember that prior to displacement the respondents owned homes and land but 
upon displacement have lost most of their resources and in the case of Bukavu were forced to 
adapt to a very different economy. One man residing in Bukavu stated: 
Life is more difficult in Bukavu compared to the village because here you have to 
pay for everything while you only make a very small income.  
Similarly a woman also residing in Bukavu explained:  
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It [life] is very hard here. I really do not like the way I live here, life was better at 
home. When I was home, I could cultivate my field and have enough to feed my 
family and make an income.  
 
Many respondents spoke of the difficulties and inabilities of paying rent, something uncommon 
in villages. One man living in Bukavu reported: 
Life here is very hard. Here you have to pay rent on houses but you do not have 
enough income to pay the bills.  
Another participant similarly described the predicament: 
In Bukavu you have to rent a house but you have no land and need money for 
food. That is much more difficult than the agricultural way of life. It is very 
difficult to go from life in Nindja to always struggling here.  
A few respondents reported being evicted at times when they were unable to pay rent.  
 
Food Insecurity 
Another common theme was food insecurity. For many IDPs food insecurity is a constant 
struggle following displacement. As one woman living in Bukavu said: 
Here [Bukavu] we die from huger, there [Nindja] we die by the knife. It is better 
to die from hunger than die by the knife. 
Participants both in Bukavu and Mudaka spoke of food insecurity and inability to feed their 
families. As the vast majority of rural households are engaged in some form of agriculture, even 
if it was only subsistence, it was enough not to face chronic food insecurity at the household 
level. A few respondents weighed the difficulty of daily life against the relative security. As one 
participant residing in Mudaka explained: 
 Life here is really hard, but at least I sleep safely in my house at night. 
 
Future Hopes: Return or Integration 
There was a significant contrast between participants in Bukavu and Mudaka over their desire to 
return home, if it was safe enough. Ninety percent of respondents in Bukavu wished to return 
(Table 5.13), compared to only 36% in Mudaka who wished to return (Table 5.14). Respondents 
from both locations lost their homes and experienced trauma. The dataset was analyzed to 
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determine if those who personally experienced traumas were less likely to wish to return to their 
homes. Eleven of the 28 participants in Bukavu that wished to one day return to their village had 
directly experienced violence in their village. Exposure to violence at home did not appear to 
affect respondents’ desires to return home. Some respondents spoke of their desire to return 
home to their resources, as one man from Ikoma stated: 
Yes, of course I wish to return. All of my goods are there, especially my farm land.  
Similarly a woman from Nyamunbanda explained: 
I wish to go back to my village because then I will be able to cultivate and gain 
money to support my family. I pray for peace so that I may return.  
Of the two respondents in Bukavu who did not wish to return home one had personally 
experienced violence in her village. In comparison, eight of the twelve participants residing in 
Mudaka who said they did not want to return to their village had personally experienced violence 
in their village. One of the common reasons given by respondents in Mudaka for not wanting to 
return was bad memories, as one woman explained: 
I do not wish to return [to Nindja] because I will be remembering my children 
that were killed there. 
Table 5.13: Bukavu Participants Desire to Return Home 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 28 90.3 
No 2 6.5 
Unknown 1 3.2 
Total 31 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
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Table 5.14: Mudaka Participants Desire to Return Home 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 7 36.8 
No 12 63.2 
Total 19 100 
Source: Field research December 2011 and January 2012. 
 
The difference may in part be due to the differences of daily life in the two towns. Respondents 
residing in Mudaka are able to continue livelihoods in the agricultural sector, similar to their 
lives prior to displacement. The smaller size of Mudaka also means less competition for 
employment in the informal sector. In comparison, IDPs in Bukavu must adapt new livelihood 
strategies, outside of the agricultural sector. The over-saturation of the informal job market 
creates competition even at the lowest levels. Additionally, the urban environment is very 
different from the villages that displaced come from.   
 
These findings suggest that differences between Mudaka and Bukavu have more of an impact on 
the desire to return to ones village than past traumatic experiences. The current struggles that 
respondents described of poverty, food insecurity, and lack of material resources are examples of 
daily stressors. Currently psychosocial advocates are one of the primary groups paying attention 
to the affects that daily stressors have on the mental health, as well as overall quality of life of 
conflict-affected persons184. While limited in scope this dataset suggests that these daily stressors 
may have more bearing on respondents than past traumatic exposure. 
 
In considering durable solutions this research indicates that quality of life will affect IDPs 
preference of return or integration. Additionally, the situation in Bukavu raises questions of the 
capacity of urban centers to be considered as locations of integration. To what extent does the 
integration of IDPs contribute to rapid urbanization and what are the affects of hosting displaced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Kenneth Miller and Andrew Rasmussen, “War Exposure, Daily Stressors, and Mental Health in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Settings: Bridging the Divide between Trauma-Focused and Psychosocial Frameworks,” in Social 
Science and Medicine, 70 (2010), 7.    
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populations on the urban population? McDowell found that at the household level displaced can 
only be hosted for so long before their presence depletes the household resources, eventually 
making both the host and displaced vulnerable185. There is a need to examine this at the macro-
level as well. Additionally, assuming that the majority of IDPs were involved in the agricultural 
sector prior to displacement, their protracted displacement is at a loss to the regions food 
production. Given that the region is food insecure, the loss of IDPs traditional livelihoods not 
only affects the displaced but also urban centers like Bukavu that rely on rural agricultural 
production.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore and identify common experiences of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) living outside of displacement camps in the South Kivu province of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Existing literature on the topic was explored, 
highlighting the lack of attention given to IDPs who do not seek refuge in formal camps. Despite 
the fact that the vast majority of IDPs live outside of camps, humanitarian actors, policy makers, 
and scholars have been slow to recognize this population. The lack of research on self-settled 
IDPs means that policies, including durable solutions, are being developed in a top-down 
approach, without research-based knowledge. Durable solutions for IDPs include: return, 
integration, and resettlement within the country. However, lack of research on the experiences of 
IDPs living with host communities, as well as the affects that hosting IDPs has on local 
communities, results in a disconnect between policy and reality on the ground.  
 
By documenting the displacement experience of IDPs living in the host communities of Mudaka 
and Bukavu, the author found that all participants were in fact displaced due to the conflict. The 
majority of participants had directly experienced violence related to the conflict. Despite high-
levels of insecurity many participants choose to remain in the nearby bush or a close-by village 
in order to maintain access to their resources and livelihood strategies. The persistence of 
violence eventually pushed the displaced to move further away from their homes to 
comparatively secure areas. The reason behind choices for current sites of refuge was primarily 
due to security, but networks of family and friends also attracted participants to their current 
locations. 
 
For displaced who did not have family or friends to host them, they were forced to rely on 
strangers and community centers. By the time of research, many of the displaced had secured 
their own housing, however, some remained dependent on hosts. IDPs living outside of camps 
have the dilemma of needing to secure housing and food despite having lost their traditional 
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livelihood strategy. As it is extremely unlikely that they receive any humanitarian assistance, 
self-settled IDPs must adapt new livelihood strategies. These new survival livelihoods often are 
not enough to cover all the financial demands displaced are faced with. These subsistence 
livelihoods leave IDPs vulnerable to eviction and food insecurity. Faced with the costs of food 
and shelter, parents are unable to pay school fee for their children, creating a cycle of poverty.  
 
IDPs in Mudaka were able to secure informal work in the agricultural sector. While IDPs in 
Mudaka were working on other peoples land instead of their own, their new livelihoods were 
similar to those they had prior to displacement. In contrast, IDPs in Bukavu often worked as 
porters, competing for in the over-saturated informal job market with the local urban poor. The 
urban environment in Bukavu leaves IDPs in a sustained position of economic vulnerability. 
While organizations have initiated programs in vocational training, disconnects persists on the 
ground level. Vocational training in leatherworks or wood carvings is relatively useless as there 
is no local market for these goods. Organizations are beginning to recognize the need for local 
market research to identify what goods and skills are actually in demand186. There is also a need 
to recognize the potential of over-saturation of a particular good or service. Additionally, many 
of these programs are tailored to victims of sexual violence and former child soldiers, targeting 
needs to be expanded to include IDPs as well, as they are also an economically vulnerable 
population.  
 
The loss of livelihoods must also be considered in relation to the Congo’s persistent food 
insecurity. The majority of rural households in South Kivu are involved in agricultural 
production and as the majority of IDPs in the province were displaced from rural areas we can 
assume that the majority of IDPs in the province were involved in the agriculture sector. Thus, 
the loss of these IDPs livelihood strategies likely impacts the regions food insecurity. Even if the 
IDPs were only involved in subsistence agriculture, after displacement they become another 
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household dependent on a diminishing sector. Further research is necessary to determine the 
extent of the loss of agricultural production due to conflict-induced displacement.  
 
When considering the possibilities of durable solutions, the realities on the ground are necessary 
to determine implementation. As long as IDPs living outside of camps are not recognized by 
policy makers or humanitarian agencies, any framework will be over-looking a large proportion 
of the displaced population. In order to understand a displacement crisis one cannot choose to 
over-look the majority of IDPs because they are not easily accessible or identifiable. Without 
research on the consequences of hosting IDPs on local communities, the sustainability of 
integration and resettlement remains unknown.  Failing to acknowledge the consequences on 
hosts at the micro-and macro-levels will hinder the implementation of sustainable durable 
solutions. This is not meant to argue in favor of encampment or one durable solution over 
another. The point of this research was to highlight the experiences of IDPs who remain invisible 
to actors and researchers.  
 
Attention must be given to self-settled IDPs in order to develop policies and practices that are 
representative of the reality on the ground. Failure to do so will result in a continued knowledge 
gap on integration and will hinder the development of implementable solutions. This case-study 
brought up questions on the relationships between the conflict and displacement, invisibility, 
rapid urbanization, food insecurity, and livelihoods. Further research is needed on every one of 
these topics and their relationship to internal displacement. Researchers need to conduct more 
case-studies on conflict-induced IDPs, particularly self-settled, so that policy makers can develop 
research-based frameworks and practitioners can design interventions that adequately meet the needs 
of the entire population instead of limiting themselves to those most visible. This means all 
parties must face and admit past failures and inadequacies of current approaches. If actors remain 
unwilling to do so then they are ultimately undermining the very purpose of their work.  
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Appendix: Interview Guide 
 
How old are you/ What year were you born? 
 
What ethnic group/tribe do you belong to? 
 
Are you married or single? 
 
Do you have any children? How many? 
 
What village are you from? 
 
When did you first leave your village? 
 
How old were you when left your village? 
 
Can you tell me why you left your village? 
 
Where did you first go to when you left your village? 
 
Tell me about your journey to get here? 
 
Why did you choose here? 
 
When you first arrived here where did you stay? 
 
Who lives with you? 
 
Have you/Do you receive any assistance from any NGO’s? If so when and what type of 
assistance? 
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How do you support yourself and your family? 
 
Tell me about life here? 
 
Do you get along with the local community? 
 
Do you feel safe here? 
 
Do you plan to return to your village? 
 
Would you like to return to your village? 
 
Date: __________________________________________ 
 
Interviewer: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Translator: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
